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"Deserving Disabilities":
Why the Definition of Disability Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be
Revised to Eliminate the Substantial
Limitation Requirement
Cheryl L. Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
A commentator on a public radio program recently spoke in favor of the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") by asserting that "[t]he blind, deaf,
and crippled really do deserve our help."' Although this commentator purported
to support the ADA, his actual message was that the definition of "disability" in
the Act is excessively vague and allows individuals not "deserving" of legal
protection, such as persons with back impairments and mental impairments, to,
in his words, "[hitch] a ride on the disability bandwagon."2 His argument that
the ADA should reach only the claims of "deserving" individuals with
disabilities has had powerful resonance since the enactment of the ADA. Recent
United States Supreme Court rulings restricting the ADA's protected class
demonstrate the persuasiveness of this argument
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual
with a disability" who, with or without reasonable accommodations, can perform
the essential functions of the job in question. 4 "Disability" is defined as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities," "a record of such an impairment," or "being regarded as having such
an impairment."' According to the view described above, the part of the

* B.A, J.D., LL.M., Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School
of Law. The Author would like to thank Janet Jacobsen, R. J. Robertson, and Kevin
Shelley for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and Tanja Cook, Christian
Davis, and Christopher Stalets for their research assistance.
1. Commentary of David Manasian, Marketplace(Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, Oct.
16, 1998).
2. Id. The criticism has been echoed in other commentary. See, e.g., Don C.
Brunell, Mental Disordersat Work, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 15, 1997, at J1;
David Frum, Oh, My Aching Back (Head), FORBES, Nov. 8, 1993, at 64; Ruth Shalit,
Defining Disability Down: Why Johnny Can't Read, Write, or Sit Still, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16.
3. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999) (holding that
individuals with correctable impairments that are not presently substantially limited in
any major life activities are not covered by the ADA's anti-discrimination provisions).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112 (a) (1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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definition that requires the impairment be "substantially limiting" operates as a
gate designed to allow only a carefully screened few to assert civil rights
protections. 6
The ADA is unlike other civil rights statutes because its protected class
must be determined on a case-by-case basis.' The extent to which an individual
possesses a protected characteristic is not examined in other civil rights contexts
before an individual may assert protected class status.' In the findings section

of the ADA, Congress expressed its concern that persons with disabilities are9
subject to stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of individual abilities.
There is no real question that Congress intended a case-by-case evaluation of
whether the plaintiff has a covered disability.' 0 By choosing to frame the inquiry
around the question of whether an alleged impairment "substantially limits" a
major life activity, however, Congress adopted a process that perpetuates rather
than resolves the stereotyping problems that the ADA was designed to combat.
The result of the case-by-case approach has been that courts are making
normative distinctions between persons with different disabilities based on their
perception of whether the individual is someone the ADA was intended to
2
cover," and inappropriately disposing of cases that should be left to juries.

6. The Court's reasoning in Sutton powerfully demonstrates this concept and is
discussed in more detail in Part II of this Article.
7. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Analysis and
Implicationsof a Second-GenerationCivil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.

413, 441-42 (1991) (describing how determination of protected class membership under
the ADA is different from other anti-discrimination statutes based on race, sex, age,
religion, and national origin).
8. Id. at 442. For example, in the context of male-on-male sexual harassment, the
Supreme Court recently rejected the concept that only certain "sex" plaintiffs should be
entitled to proceed under Title VII. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523
U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998) (holding that sex discrimination consisting of same-sex sexual
harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Male or female

status is all that is required for protected class status, and no inquiry into sexual
orientation, gender, or any other factor is required. Id. (rejecting notion that sexual
harassment occurs only when there is sexual desire based on sexual orientation). Sex is,
in other words, a self-evident concept for civil rights purposes. "Disability" is not. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
10. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.20) (1999) (noting that ADA did not set out laundry
list of covered disabilities out ofrecognition that some impairments may be impairing for
some individuals and not for others).
11. See generallyRobert L. Burgdorf, Jr., SubstantiallyLimited Protectionfrom
DisabilityDiscrimination: The Special TreatmentModel and Misconstructionsof the
Definition ofDisability,42 VILL. L. REv. 409 (1997); Ruth Colker, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1998);
Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of
Disability Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107 (1997).
12. See Colker, supra note 11, at 101, 109-10; Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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Indeed, disability has been given such a narrow interpretation in recent decisions
that it is now quite difficult for ADA plaintiffs to get past the summary judgment
3

stage.1

An overlooked or, perhaps more properly, disregarded result of the case-bycase protected class approach has been the creation of a subclass of individuals

who suffer from physical or mental impairments affecting major life activities
and who lose employment or other opportunities because of those impairments,
but who have no right of redress under federal disability laws. These are the

"not impaired enough" plaintiffs. Both supporters of broad and narrow
interpretations of disability apparently believe that some such individuals are
properly excluded from coverage; they simply disagree on where the line is to
be drawn.

4

By way of example, Professor Ruth Colker, a leading critic of the way
courts have narrowly construed the ADA, characterized the Casey Martin-PGA
golf cart case 5 as a "trivial cause" that diverted attention from individuals with

Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How Individualizing the Determinationof
"Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VIL. L. REv. 327, 332-33 (1997).
13. See Colker, supra note 11, at 119, 125-26; Locke, supra note 11, at 113-15.
14. See, e.g., Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions
ofthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct: PartI-WorkplaceAccommodations,46 DEPAUL
L. REv. 877, 881 (1997). Professor Blanck explains the purpose of the definition of
disability with its requirement that the plaintiff show substantial limitation as follows:
The first prong definition of disability does not mean that a covered
individual must work at the job of his choice. Rather, to fall under the first
prong definition, the individual's "access" to the relevant labor market must
be substantially limited by the impairment or condition. Put differently, an
individual's failure to qualify for one job in a given labor market, even
because of a substantial impairment or condition, does not necessarily mean
that the individual has a covered disability for purposes of Title I analysis.

Id. at 881.
For a notable recent exception to the view that some individuals with impairments
should be excluded from coverage, see Lisa Eichhom, Major Litigation Activities
Regarding Major Life Activities: The Failureof the "Disability" Definition in the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1405 (1999). Eichhom
advocates revising the definition of disability to eliminate any consideration other than
the presence of impairment. Id. at 1473; see also infra notes 265-68 and accompanying
text.
15. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998). Martin sued the
Professional Golf Association (PGA), alleging that he required the use of a golf cart in
order to participate in professional golf tournaments because of a congenital defect in his
right leg that placed him at risk for a tibia fracture when walking. Id. at 1242. The PGA
refused to accommodate Martin, arguing first, that the ADA does not apply to
professional golf tournaments, and second, that waiving the walking rule for Martin
would fundamentally alter the nature ofprofessional golf competitions. Id. at 1244. The
court rejected both arguments, finding that use of a golf cart by Martin was a reasonable
accommodation of his condition. Id. at 1253.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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"genuine disabilities who have been losing their cases under inappropriately
narrow interpretations of the term 'disability."" 16 While Professor Colker may
be correct in claiming that there are other, more substantially impaired
individuals who have been denied the opportunity to proceed with ADA claims,
the underlying value judgment of her position is intriguing. It is, indeed, the
basic underlying value judgment of the ADA. Namely, that it is proper to draw
distinctions among individuals with impairments in order to provide
discrimination coverage to the "deserving" disabled.
. This Article asks whether the ADA's employment discrimination
provisions
can be defended as long as the statute bases protected class status on a concept
of "substantial limitation.' 17 This Article concludes that in order to avoid the
perpetuation of stereotypes about the nature of disability, the statute should be
revised to remove the "substantially limits" requirement. Part II of this Article
demonstrates how the definition of disability found under the ADA evolved as
a product of societal, legislative, and judicial attitudes about the nature of
disability.' 8 The Supreme Court's most recent ADA decisions, in which the
Court construed the term "substantially limits" in a way that is arguably
consistent with the language of the ADA but which clearly illustrates the
inherent problems with definitions for the protected class, are also examined. 9
Part I then turns to several of the inherent conflicts created by the current
statutory definition of disability. More specifically, Part III demonstrates how
the ADA treats persons with disabilities differently in a way that undermines the
goals of civil rights statutes and the concept of disability as a group-based civil
rights issue.2" Further, Part III argues that the part of the ADA that was
specifically designed to address stereotypes, namely the third prong which
protects individuals "regarded as" having a disability, is itself inadequate to

16. Ruth Colker, Martin v. Professional Golf Association: Why Do We Care?,THE
Feb. 19, 1998. Professor Colker suggested that Casey Martin was
not a person protected by the ADA because he was someone "who simply walk[ed] at
a below average speed or [was] precluded from participating in professional sports." Id.
17. I limit my consideration to Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability
discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). The general definition
of disability that is at issue in this Article appears in the general provisions of the ADA
and is also applicable to Titles II and III of the Act, which prohibit disability
discrimination by public entities and public accommodations, respectively. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining disability as used in this "chapter"); 42 U.S.C. §
12132 (1994) (prohibiting discrimination by public entities); 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994)
(prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations). Although only employment
discrimination is considered in this Article, the underlying reasons I urge for modifying
the definition of disability would for the most part apply to the other titles of the Act as
COLUMBUS DISPATCH,

well. I reserve for another day consideration of whether Title II or Title III might require
their own unique definition of disability in some circumstances.
18. See infra notes 25-116 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 116-54 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 154-212 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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redress this problem because it also allows courts to make normative distinctions
based on "substantially limits."2 Moreover, unlike individuals who can proceed
under the first prong, not-impaired-enough plaintiffs relegated to the "regarded
as" prong are likely not entitled to reasonable accommodations necessary for
them to perform a job.22
Finally, Part IV considers how the ADA would be interpreted and applied
if "substantially limits" is removed from the definition of disability.23 This
revision would substantially resolve the conflicts identified in Part III.
Moreover, it would place the emphasis in disability discrimination cases on the
mechanisms that work more effectively to determine which cases have merit and
which do not-the requirements that an individual be "qualified" and that any
requested job accommodations be "reasonable." 24
II. PARADIGMS OF "DISABILITY" AND "SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS"
What exactly is "disability?" The term is not self-defining. Some
definition is needed, however, to establish what class of persons is intended to
be benefitted by the ADA. The current definition of disability has a complicated
history. On one level, it reflects a conscious choice to emphasize individualized
assessment in response to a prior system that failed to treat individuals with
disabilities as unique persons with unique needs and skills. On another level, it
reflects a lack of insight into the consequences of incorporating concepts about

defining the protected class that come from prior statutes with different goals.
This Part traces the history of the definition of disability now found in the ADA,
culminating with the Supreme Court's most recent rulings on that definition.

A. Models of Thinking About Disability
Early in a disability law course, the professor is likely to emphasize the
importance of terminology to students-that "individual with a disability" is
preferable to "disabled person" or "handicapped. ' 25 As one textbook author
explains, this is not merely a lesson in political correctness but rather a reflection
of evolution in attitude.26 The evolution of the legal rights of individuals with

21. See infra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 227-39 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 240-316 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 317-54 and accompanying text.
25. Both of the leading authors of disability law texts raise the importance of
discussing "people first" terminology, such as "individual with a disability" in the
introductory sections of the course. See RUTH COLKER &BONNIE POITRAS TUCKER, THE
LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION (TEACHER'S MANUAL) 1 (2d ed. 1998); LAURA F.
ROTHSTEIN, DIsABILITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS (TEACHER'S MANUAL) 2

(2d ed. 1998).
26. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 25, at 2.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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disabilities can be seen in the changes in the language used to describe such
persons. An examination of the historic treatment of disability issues shows why
contemporary disability law places so much emphasis on individual, case-bycase determination of the existence of a protected disability.
In the nineteenth century, the most common label applied to individuals
with disabilities was "afflicted., 27 This terminology was rooted in religious
belief that "God, in His mysterious wisdom, had afflicted someone with this
particular burden, and they were supposed to bear it with patience and faith,
trusting that the affliction was part of somelarger plan. People were afflicted for
'
a reason-to learn a lesson, to teach other people pity and charity, and so on."28
29
Also referred to as the moral model of disability, this form of thinking viewed
individuals with disabilities as undeserving of individual rights.3" Rather, society
needed to be protected from these deviants by having them removed to
institutions and sterilizing them to prevent future deviants from being born. 3'
The harsh moral model softened into a charity-based concept of
benevolence toward people with disabilities, as part of the philanthropic
movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.32 This in turn led
to the emergence of a medical model of disability. Under this model, instead of
being viewed as a spiritual inferiority, disability was viewed as a physical
infirmity that a person should try to overcome by rehabilitation and training.33
Nevertheless, disability still rendered people different and inferior, and any
social disadvantage that such persons suffered was the direct result of the
disability itself.34 Society's only obligation was to provide the individual with
treatment for the infirmity through rehabilitation programs.35 If the person could

27. Interview of historian Doug Bayton, BeyondAffliction: The DisabilityHistory
Project (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcast, May 1998), transcript available at <http://
www.npr.org/programs/disability/bashows.dir/revoluti.dir/prg3_tr.html>.
28. Id.
29. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with
Disabilities,40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1341, 1345-46 (1993).
30. Id. at 1346 n.14 (summarizing the views of a Reagan administration official,
as -recently as 1985, expressing a belief that "the handicapped constituency" was

misplaced in seeking legal protection for what they spiritually deserved to bear).
31. Bonnie O'Day, Discriminationon the Basis of Disability: The Need for a
Third Wave Movement, Economics v. Civil Rights, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 291,

291 (1994) (describing the protectionist model of disability policy).
32. See O'Day, supra note 31, at 291.
33. See Mary Crossley, The DisabilityKaleidoscope, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 621,

649-50 (1999); Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1347.
34. See Crossley, supra note 33, at 649-50.
35. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1348.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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not be "normalized" through rehabilitation, he or she should accept his or her
fate as a nonproductive member of society.36
The terminology associated with the medical model of disability reflects
how the law treated these individuals.' Individuals with disabilities were
considered "handicapped," such as in "handicapped in the race for life." As
historian Doug Bayton describes it, "[w]hile an 'affliction' was a spiritual burden
to be borne with faith and lived with as best as possible, in submission to God's
wisdom, a 'handicap' was a condition to37 be conquered, an impediment to
worldly success that had to be overcome.
The medical model sought to place "the physically, mentally and socially
handicapped in positions where their particular handicap would not interfere
with the work to be done. 38 Special employment bureaus were developed for
individuals with disabilities.39 As explained by a sociologist of that era, this
approach failed because it was "impossible to create a market for the labor of
crippled adults without fitting them, by training in suitable kinds of industry,
to
40
compete on practically even terms with those who were not handicapped.
To address the limitations of the employment marketplace, a system of
vocational rehabilitation training was then developed, which evolved into a twotier system. The first tier was for those persons, predominately injured workers
and soldiers returning from the World Wars, who were otherwise "able-bodied"
but needed assistance returning to the competitive workforce. 4' The second tier
was for people with disabilities who were deemed unable to participate in the
competitive workforce and consisted predominately of menial employment in
"sheltered workshops."42
'
In either respect, these rehabilitation-based approaches perpetuated the idea
that a disability was a personal trait to be overcome with the help of outside

36. Crossley, supra note 33, at 650; Drimmer, supranote 29, at 1348. Related to
the medical model is the social pathology model, which focuses on identification of
normal patterns of behavior and deviation therefrom. See Drimmer, supranote 29, at
1348-49. According to social pathology theory, disability is primarily a question of
attitude and acceptance of group norms. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1348-49. Like
the medical model, this model also views disability as an individual defect that must be
overcome through the help of experts. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1348-49.
37. Interview of Doug Bayton, supra note 27.
38. FRANK DEKKER WATSON, THE CHARITY ORGANIZATION MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 369 (1922).
39. Id. at 369-70.
40. Id. at 371 (quoting THE CHARITY ORGANIZATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
THIRTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 55 (1912)).
41. Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1364.

42. Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1369.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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experts.43 The goal was to raise productivity, not to address prejudice and stigma
attached to disability itself."
A more contemporary view of disability that addresses issues of prejudice
and stigma emerged as a product of the civil rights movement of the 1960s and
early 1970s. By the early 1970s, several groups of disability activists had
emerged who viewed disability as a civil rights issue. They viewed the rhetoric
used by black activists as a powerful tool in accomplishing their own objective
of increasing participation of people with disabilities in society. 45 They argued
that people with disabilities in this country had a history of decisions being made
for them by others and of institutional and structural segregation.46
In particular, these advocates argued that barriers to participation in both the
private labor market and government-supported services were arbitrary,
discriminatory, and not based on individualized assessments of personal
capabilities.47 The limited participation of persons with disabilities was not
solely because of their physical or mental limitations, as the moral and medical
models assumed, but largely from socially constructed limitations.48
"Disability," in other words, was not a problem to be overcome by the individual
but rather a set of external standards created by a society that believed it knew

how people should be.
The present civil rights, or minority rights, model thus attacks assumptions
made about persons with disabilities and insists on individualized assessment.

43. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1365.
44. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1368. An illustration of the exultation of
productivity over stigma is the sheltered workshop system. Fred Pelka describes the
history of the use of sheltered workshops to provide menial employment to individuals
with disabilities in segregated settings, a system that perpetuated itself not because it
provided individuals with disabilities skills needed to integrate into the general workforce
(the workshop's original purpose), but because there was a ready and productive labor
pool available who could be paid little money by the non-disabled managers of the
workshops who had guaranteed government contracts. See FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 281-83 (1997).
45. RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING
FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY 31 (1984). The disability rights movement came about
slightly later than other civil rights movements because of the diversity of people with
disabilities. Robert Scotch has described how these groups had to, in effect, overcome
their diversity in order to form a community of activists and advocates. Id. at 41.
46. See SCOTCH, supra note 45, at 31.
47. See SCOTCH, supra note 45, at 31.
48. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1355-57. Drimmer presents examples of
arbitrariness such as "placing the buttons in an elevator at a height where a person in a
wheelchair cannot reach them and constructing a doorway too narrow for a wheelchair
to enter." Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1355 n.57. Both of these are examples of
structures designed by cultural norms about use of space, rather than by any actual
physical imperative.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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Eradicating perceptions of inferiority is at the center of this model. 49 The main
causes of discrimination against persons with disabilities are seen to stem from
oversight, fear, and prejudicei 0 Remedies for this discrimination are not based
on charity or benevolence, but require the enforcement of basic rights necessary
to combat the resulting social
51 hierarchy that first defines and then subordinates
persons with disabilities.
One particular set of stereotypes that the contemporary view of disability
also rejects is the idea that individuals with disabilities are "special,"
"inspirational," or "courageous. '5 2 Individuals with disabilities commonly reject
these characterizations as labels that magnify their differences and suggest that
any success or accomplishment is uncommon or heroic. 3 Yet, this "special"
characterization has worked itself inextricably into the way that disability is
defined under federal anti-discrimination law.
B. The Rise ofthe "SubstantialLimitation" Concept
Interestingly, the category of persons entitled to participate in early
vocational rehabilitation programs was defined quite broadly, at least with
respect to physical disabilities. The Smith-Fess Act of 1920"4 extended

vocational rehabilitation services to "any person who, by reason of a physical
defect or infirmity, whether congenital or acquired by accident, injury, or
disease, is, or may be expected to be, totally or partially incapacitated for
remunerative occupation."55 Despite this broad definition, the statute
nonetheless reflected a social policy that assumed disability was relevant only
to the extent that unemployed, unproductive persons with disabilities had
negative economic consequences for the nation. 6 In that sense, the statute not

49. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1358.
50. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1357.
51. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1358.

52. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 534-35 (describing reaction of disability
advocates to characterization of being "special" because they have had to deal with

disabling conditions in life).
53. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 534-35.
54. Smith-Fess Act of 1920, ch. 219,41 Stat. 735 (1920) (codified as amended at

29 U.S.C. §§ 731-41 (repealed and reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355(1973))).
55. Smith-Fess Act of 1920. The early versions of the Act also defined the targeted
beneficiaries of the Act as "persons disabled in industry or in any legitimate occupation
[for] their return to civil[ian] employment." Id.
56. In fact, when the Vocational Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1954 to
increase its funding, Congress expressly stated that the purpose of the funding was to
"increas[e] not only [handicapped persons'] social and economic well-being, but also the
productive capacity ofthe Nation." Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954,

ch. 655, §1, 68 Stat. 652 (1954) (repealed and reenacted in Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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only perpetuated the stigma associated with disability," but in some respects laid
the groundwork for the contemporary judicial view of federal disability law as
reaching only those persons whose employment opportunities are generally
foreclosed.5 8
The earlier definition of the beneficiary class was substantially revised with
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954."9 This statute made
services available to the "handicapped, ' 60 and for the first time the concept of
substantial limitation appeared in the definition of the beneficiary class: "'the
term physically handicapped individual' means any individual who is under a

Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355(1973)).
57. See Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1368. Drimmer argues that the Act's emphasis
on returning persons to the workplace is an application of the medical model of
disability, which emphasizes "curing" or "fixing" the person with the disability.
Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1364-65. Thus, persons with disabilities are perceived as an
inferior class, worthy of integration into society only if they can be made able to diminish
the financial effects of their assumed lack of productivity. See Drimmer, supranote 29,
at 1368.
58. As will be discussed later in the Article, courts interpreting the ADA have
repeatedly stated that plaintiffs in disability discrimination cases must prove more than
exclusion from a single, particular job in order to establish that they are "substantially
limited in the major life activity of working" under the first prong of the definition of
disability. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text. Even proponents of the ADA
appear to accept this proposition under a theory that the Act protects only those
individuals whose "access" to the labor market is substantially limited. See Blanck,
supranote 14, at 881 (reasoning that "the first-prong definition of disability does not
mean that a covered individual must work at the job of his choice"). This view does not
seem far removed from the social attitudes that defined the scope of responsibility as
"helping" the disabled by finding them some work they can do "where their particular
handicap [will not] interfere with the work to be done." WATSON, supranote 38, at 369.
59. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954 § 11 (b).

60. Confusingly, the appropriations section of the 1954 Act referred only to the
"physically handicapped" while defining that term to include both physical and mental
disability. Section 1 of the 1954 Act provided that its purpose was to appropriate funds
to States for "rehabilitating physically handicapped individuals," but the definition of
"physically handicapped" in Section 1l(b) included both physical and mental disabilities.
Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954 §§ 1, 11(b). This appears to have
been an odd carryover of language from the Smith-Fess Act which limited coverage to

persons with physical infirmities but described the beneficiary class as "persons
disabled." Smith-Fess Act of 1920, ch. 219, 41 Stat. 735, 735 (1920); see also supra
note 54 and accompanying text. In 1943, Congress expanded the services provided
under that Act to include persons with mental disabilities, without directly amending the
section that defined "persons disabled." Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1943, ch. 190, 57 Stat. 374 (1943). The reenactment of the statute in 1954 perpetuated
this disjointed structure. Finally, in 1965, Congress amended the Act again and included
"technical amendments" that changed the terminology in Section 1 to simply

"handicapped." Pub. L. No. 89-333, § 1,79 Stat. 1282 (1965).
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physical or mental disability which constitutes a substantial handicap to
employment but which is of such a nature that vocational rehabilitation services
may reasonably
be expected to render him fit to engage in remunerative
6
occupation. , 1
The legislative history of this revision does not explain what Congress
meant when it adopted the term "substantial handicap." The legislative history
to the 1954 amendments as a whole reflects a concern that the coverage of the
federal law should be expanded in order to provide services to persons with the
potential to become productive members of the workforce. 62 Nothing in the
legislative history suggests that the law needed to be confined to benefit only
truly deserving individuals or that limiting services to those with "substantial
handicaps" was the way to accomplish any such goal.
Congress continued an expansive view of the coverage of the rehabilitation
acts when it repealed the Vocational Rehabilitation Act and reenacted it as the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.63 This statute carried forward a definition of
"handicapped individual" similar to that found in the old vocational
rehabilitation act.64 At the same time, Congress took steps to broaden the scope
of the Act beyond its vocational training model. For example, Congress
eliminated the word "vocational" from the title of the Act.65 Second, and more
significantly, it included Section 504, which provides in its entirety, "No
otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in

section 7(6), shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' '

61. Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1954, ch. 655, § 11 (b), 68 Stat.
652, 660 (1954) (repealed and reenacted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973)).
62. See S. REP. No. 1626, reprintedin 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. (68 Stat.) 2862, 2863-64
(describing need for the legislation in economic terms of returning individuals to "useful"
work and eliminating their need to rely on public support).
63. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
64. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 §7(6). The definition of "handicapped individual"
did reflect several significant changes. First, it expanded the goals associated with
rehabilitating the person. Under the 1965 version of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act,
which was in effect at the time the new Rehabilitation Act was passed, a candidate for
rehabilitation was someone who could "reasonably be expected [to be made] fit to engage
in [gainful employment]." Pub. L. No. 89-333, § 10(a), 79 Stat. at 1293. Under the new
version, the Act applied to those who "can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of
employability from vocational rehabilitation services." Rehabilitation Act of 1973 §
7(6). The Senate Report explains that this change was made in order to emphasize
vocational goals rather than assumptions about fitness. S. REP. No. 318, at 21 (1973),
reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2094.
65. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Preamble.
66. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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The historic significance of Section 504 cannot be understated. It
represents the triumph of disability advocates in reorienting Congress's thinking
about disability as a civil rights issue and not merely a rehabilitation issue. The
language of Section 504 was in fact modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,67 which prohibits race discrimination by recipients of federal funds. 8
At the same time, however, the Act as a whole continued the vocational.
rehabilitation
model by incorporating the prior statute's limitation of
"services., 69 The legislative history of the Act contains no particular discussion
of the implications of Section 504 in this regard.7 ° Section 504 itself appears to
have been a routine inclusion that failed to spark the particular interest of anyone
in Congress at the time.7
More to the point for purposes of this Article, no connection was made
between Section 504 and the "substantial handicap" language in the Act's
definition of disability. In other words, Congress did not expressly intend that
individualized assessments were required to constrain the civil rights protections
of the statute. To the extent that Congress discussed coverage of the Act, it
expressed concern that states were providing rehabilitation services only in the
''easiest" cases and avoiding working with people with the most severe
disabilities whose vocational prospects were more challenging.72 It wanted to
be sure that states made maximum effort to help individuals with severe
disabilities, and it required state plans to set out a method of selection giving

67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (1994).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VI specifically provides that "[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, or denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
Scotch describes how the one sentence of Section 504 was added to the already pending
rehabilitation bill by a group of congressional staffers who feared the purposes of the Act
would be blocked by negative attitudes and discrimination by employers when it came
time to hire people who had completed their rehabilitation training. See SCOTCH, supra
note 45, at 52. One of the staffers had worked on prior legislation that was itself based
on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and had the statutory language handy in his office.
See SCOTCH, supra note 45, at 52. The staffers simply adapted that language to the
context of disability. See SCOTCH, supra note 45, at 52.
69. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355, 361
(1973).
70. See Mark F. Engebretson, AdministrativeAction to End DiscriminationBased
on Handicap: HEW's § 504 Regulation, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 63 (1979).
71. See SCOTCH, supra note 45, at 5; see also JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE
wiTH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 64-65 (1993) (describing
Section 504 as a "legislative afterthought").

72. S. REP. No. 93-318, at 4, 5, 7-8, 12, 18-19 (1973), reprinted in 1973

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, at 2078, 2079, 2081, 2086, 2092.
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special emphasis to those with severe disabilities when services could not be
provided to all who were eligible. 73
This did not mean, however, that Congress intended only those individuals
with the most severe disabilities receive services. The legislative history, at
several points, suggests that the statutorily required services were intended to be
available to as many persons as possible.74 Even with a statutory class defined
as those with a "substantial handicap," the Rehabilitation Act was intended to be
broad reaching.
By 1974, it became clear to Congress that the inclusion of employability
standards in the definition of "handicapped individual" excluded a number of
people with disabilities who suffered discrimination in government programs.75
Consequently, Congress amended the definition to expand the coverage of the
Act.7 6 The result was a three prong definition of handicap: "any person who (A)
has a physical or mental disability which substantially limits one or more of such
person's major life activities, 03) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is
regarded as having such an impairment. ''" The new definition was intended to
broaden the scope of coverage beyond the employability context and, in
reference to the third prong in particular, provide protection for those individuals
who did not have an actual disability but were nonetheless treated as if they
did. 78
Once again, however, the legislative history of the 1974 amendments
provides no specific insight into why the term "substantially limits" was
incorporated into the new three part test. Congress was not working from a
clean slate, and apparently in its attempt to emphasize the broad coverage of the
Act, it simply carried over a concept that had generated little if any controversy.

C. Administrativeand JudicialDefinitionof "SubstantiallyLimits"
The actual task of defining "substantially limits" fell to the federal agencies
charged with implementing the Rehabilitation Act.79 The first agency to do so

73. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 101(a)(5).
74. S. REP. No. 93-318, at 4, 31 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076,
2103,2104.
75. S. REP. No. 98-318, at 5.
76. See S. REP. No. 98-318, at 5 (explaining that Section 504 was enacted to
"prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals ... in relation to Federal
assistance in employment, housing, transportation, education, health services, or any
other Federally-aided programs").
77. Pub. L. No. 93-516 § 11 l(a), 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974) (codified as amended
29
at U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994)). The same three categories are currently found in the
ADA's definition of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
78. S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373,
6389.
79. See Exec. Order 11,758, 3 C.F.R. 116-17 (1974) (directing Department of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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was the Department of Labor ("DOL") in 1976, as part of its implementation of
Section 503 of the Act, which requires government contractors to undertake
affirmative action to hire individuals with disabilities.8" These regulations
defined "substantially limits" to mean "likely to experience difficulty in
securing, retaining or advancing in employment because of a handicap."'"
"Difficulty" was not further defined.
Ostensibly, under these regulations, any individual who could prove she
was refused a job or fired because of an actual or perceived physical or mental
impairment could meet the threshold for inclusion in the protected class. 2 Was
this a reasonable interpretation of the statute? Arguably, it was. When Congress
rewrote the definition of handicapped individual in 1974 and adopted the three
prong approach, it rejected the employability standard because it invoked only
the range of coverage of the old vocational rehabilitation acts, which was far too
narrow to fulfill the mandate of the civil rights provisions of Sections 503 and
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 83 Congress's purpose was thus to expand the
definition to others forms of discrimination beyond employment.
The history of the term "substantial" discussed previously indicates that
Congress did not include that term in the definition of "handicapped" as a means
ofpreventing people from taking advantage of the statute. 84 Nor, for that matter,

Labor to issue regulations implementing Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act); Exec.
Order 11,914, 3 C.F.R. 117-18 (1976) (directing Department of Health, Education and
Welfare to issue regulations implementing Section 504 of Rehabilitation Act).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1994).
81. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1976) (amended in 1996 to conform to ADA
regulations). The appendix to that section contained a similar definition: "[T]he degree
that the impairment affects employability. A handicapped individual who is likely to
experience difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment would be
considered substantially limited." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741 app. A (1999).
82. C'f R. Bales, Once is Enough: Evaluating When a Person is Substantially
Limited in HerAbilityto Work, 11 HOFSTRALAB. L.J. 203,245 (1993) (advocating a rule

that would allow plaintiffs under the ADA to shift the burden of proof to employers upon
a showing that the employer relied on plaintiff's actual or perceived impairment without
having to show actual or perceived disqualification from a class ofjobs or a broad range
ofjobs). Interpreted this way, a disability discrimination case would proceed in a similar
fashion to a race or sex discrimination case involving direct proof of discrimination. Cf
Kiel v. Select Artifacts, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that
disability discrimination plaintiff who shows impermissible criteria played a motivating
part in an adverse employment decision may invoke the burden-shifting approach of
Price-Waterhousev. Hopkins,490 U.S. 228 (1989), and require employer to bear burden
of proof that same decision would have been made had improper criteria not been
utilized).
83. See S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 37-38, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389

(explaining that new definition eliminates references to employability because that test
is irrelevant to the many forms of potential discrimination covered by Section 504).
84. See Part II(b).
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did Congress apparently perceive it as a limitation on the coverage of Section
504 specifically." Thus, it would not have been inconsistent with congressional
intent to interpret the Act's coverage of employment discrimination to extend to
any person who experienced "difficulty" in obtaining or retaining employment
because one employer used that person's physical or mental impairment as a
criteria in making an employment decision.
Nonetheless, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW"),
which was charged with implementing Section 504, issued its first set of
regulations defining "handicap" in 1977 and took a different approach.8 6 These
regulations did not attempt to define the term "substantially limits" at all. In the
accompanying regulatory analysis, HEW stated that it "[did] not believe a
definition of this term is possible at this time."' HEW neither explained why it
believed the term could not be defined nor commented on the DOL's
interpretation. 8
The next step in defining "substantially limits" came from a decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Hawaii in a case entitled E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,9 a Section 503 case in which the DOL's interpretation
was at issue.90 The court in E.E. Blackrejected the DOL's approach, expressing
its concern that such an approach would read the term "substantial" out of the
statute.9' Instead, the court emphasized that each individual job seeker must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, with a determination of the number and types
ofjobs from which that person was disqualified based on the criteria used by the
employer.92
The E.E. Black factor analysis ultimately prevailed over the DOL's

employability standard. When Congress subsequently considered the definition
of disability under the ADA, the legislative history of the Act reflects that
Congress envisioned a case-by-case approach that would find some individuals
with impairments to have a disability and others not, depending on the extent of
the impairment, not the effect on the employability of the individual.93 After
Congress adopted the same three prong approach to defining disability found in

85. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
86. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22677 (1977) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1999)).
87. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A (1999).
88. See 45 C.F.R. pt 84, app. A (1999).
89. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
90. Id. at 1092-93.
91. Id. at 1099 (arguing that if Congress thought disqualification from one job was
sufficient, Congress would have used the terms "any handicap to employment" or "in any
way limits one or more of such person's major life activities").
92. Id. at 1100.
93. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334 (discussing how definition of disability is to be applied); S. REP. No. 101-116,
at 22-23 (1989) (same).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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the Rehabilitation Act, 94 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") in turn issued ADA regulations incorporating a factor-based approach
similar to that set out by the court in E.E.Black.9
Those regulations divide the first prong of "disability" into three parts,
'9 6
which are then more specifically defined: "physical or mental impairment,
"major life activity,"'97 and "substantially limits. '98 Relevant to this discussion,
major life activities are defined to include such things as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working."99 "Substantially limits" is first defined generally to
mean either "unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform," or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity."' 0 That subsection then
continues by emphasizing a factor-based analysis that looks to "(i) [t]he nature
and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected
permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment."'' °
The major life activity of "working" is given additional treatment in the
regulations. A more specific list of factors directs courts to consider whether the
individual is unable to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in
various classes because of her disability."° The regulations then list additional
factors that "may be considered":
(A) The geographical area to which the individual has reasonable
access;
(B) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types ofjobs utilizing similar
training, knowledge, skill or abilities, within that geographical area,
from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment (class ofjobs); and/or
(C) The job from which the individual has been disqualified because
of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing
similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical

94. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
95. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h), (i), (j)(1999).
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
97. 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(i) (1999).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1999).
99. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999) (emphasis added).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (1999).
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(2) (1999).
102. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1999).
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area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the
impairment (broad range of jobs in various classes). 3
The EEOC's interpretive guidance to these factors explains that an individual is
not substantially limited in the life activity of working "just because he or she is
unable to perform a particular job for one employer.. .

D. The Consequences ofthe Factor-BasedApproach
The result of the individualized assessment approach reflected in the current
regulations is striking. The current regulations require the parties to perform a
detailed assessment of exactly what the disability is and how much it affects the
person. 0 5 The "working" regulation essentially requires a vocational analysis
examining what work the person is not able to do, and finding the person

sufficiently impaired only if he isdisqualified from a number ofjobs because of
his disability. In any case, plaintiffs in disability discrimination suits must spend
considerable time litigating the extent of their limitations. This creates quite a
dilemma for plaintiffs who, assuming they prove they are impaired enough to
have a disability, must then turn around and0prove
that they are not so impaired
6
as to be unqualified for the job in question.'
Considering that the ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act, treats disability
discrimination as grounded in basic civil rights principles, 7 the adoption of
rules that require a plaintiff to show the extent of disqualification from

103. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (1999).
104. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999).
105. The appendix to the definition of "substantially limits" reinforces the case-bycase approach by explaining that "the determination of whether an individual has a
disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person
has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual." 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999).
106. See Locke, supra note 11, at 127 (noting the difficulty plaintiffs face,
especially under the major life activity of "working," in proving they are sufficiently
impaired so as to have a disability yet not so impaired they are not qualified for the
position).
107. Under the initial draft of HEW's Section 504 regulations, disability
discrimination would have been handled under a "special treatment" presumption that
called for covered entities to make a determination in each case whether the individual
with a disability needed to be treated differently or whether equal treatment would meet
the goals of the program. See Engebretson, supra note 70, at 74. The final regulations
reversed that perspective, in recognition that it might perpetuate the very kind of
discrimination Section 504 was apparently designed to eliminate. See Engebretson,
supra note 70, at 74. Discrimination under Section 504 was ultimately defined using an
equal treatment model that authorized different treatment only when necessary to
accomplish equal treatment, similar to the treatment of racial and sexual discrimination
under statutes like Titles VI and VII. See Engebretson, supra note 70, at 74.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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employment beyond a particular workplace is curious. Certainly if an employer
refused to hire or dismissed a person because of race, by way of example, the
law would not reject that person's protected status claim on a theory that other
jobs were available with other employers. 8
The legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act
reflects the success that advocates of the civil rights model had in influencing
Congress's thinking about disability. When the definition of disability was
expanded to include not only persons with actual disabilities but also persons
who had a "record of' or were "regarded as" having such a condition by others,
Congress specifically analogized disability discrimination to race discrimination
under Title VII. This was a far cry from the prior congressional rhetoric which
framed governmental concern solely in terms of productivity and benefitting the
national economy."
To some extent, the acceptance of this definition by the disability
community at that time was understandable. The history of the vocational
rehabilitation statutes demonstrates the difficulty that the severely disabled had
obtaining employment and services."' Further, physical exclusion from various
facilities ofpeople with severe mobility impairments, especially those requiring
use of wheelchairs, was perhaps one of the most prominent disability issues in
society at that time."' These and other specific disability causes were supported
by advocacy groups".. who received what they sought in the expanded
Rehabilitation Act definition.
Overlooked in the federal law's attack on prejudices and stereotypes,
however, was the fact that the statute that resulted from Congress's newly found
insight into the disability cause itself operates on prejudices and stereotypes.
Defining disability to reach only persons whose physical or mental impairments
"substantially limit" their major life activities created within the larger group of
persons with disabilities a superior/inferior hierarchy. Only those persons with

normatively superior (i.e., "substantial") disabilities are afforded civil rights
protections.

108. Cf Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple,90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1976) (describing the cumulative harm of generalizations based on

race that support denying the use of race as a criteria to disqualify a person from
employment even if the employer in question is the only one who would do so and does
so based solely on "unprejudiced" efficiency grounds).
109. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.

110. See supranote 72 and accompanying text.
111. See SHAPIRO, supra note 71, at 41-53 (describing struggle of students with
physical mobility limitations to gain access to institutions of higher education in the
1960s and how this led to formation of the Center for Independent Living).
112. Among the most active advocacy groups were those working for the blind,
people (children in particular) with mental retardation, and wheelchair users. See
SCOTCH, supra note 45, at 33-34, 36.
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Not surprisingly, courts employing the approach initiated by the
Rehabilitation Act and now reflected in the ADA regulations frequently dismiss

claims because the plaintiff has not shown she is impaired enough."' They have
been especially harsh on plaintiffs who assert claims based on a limitation of the
major life activity of working. Specifically, they tend to characterize the
plaintiffs' claims as asserting only the inability to perform a single, particular

job,""14 which the EEOC regulations provide is not a substantial limitation on the
major life activity of working,"'
More significantly, courts view this approach as reflecting a particular set
of values about the purpose of the ADA. An often cited passage from a Fourth
Circuit Rehabilitation Act decision articulates this point of view:
The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled, but genuinely
capable, individuals will not face discrimination in employment
because of stereotypes about the insurmountability of their handicaps.
It would debase this high purpose if the statutory protections available
to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose
disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment was
widely shared. Indeed, the very concept of an impairment implies a
characteristic that is not commonplace and that poses for the particular

113. See, e.g., Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.
1996) (finding individual with angina, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease
failed to present sufficient evidence that he was substantially limited in his ability to
perform any major life activities); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 191
(5th Cir. 1996) (finding individual with breast cancer failed to present sufficient evidence
that her ability to work was substantially limited as a result of the cancer and its
treatment). Interestingly enough, the early history of litigation under the Rehabilitation
Act reflects very little litigation on the issue of disability. See Crossley, supra note 33,
at 623 n. 12 (noting that in the first ten years after passage of the Rehabilitation Act, only
one court had found a plaintiff under Section 504 to not be handicapped). This trend
continued during the first years after passage of the ADA. See Locke, supra note 11, at

112 (noting the limited litigation over disability status during the early years of the
ADA). That trend has definitely been reversed. See Colker, supra note 11, at 109-10
(reporting that judges have been routinely deciding factual issues regarding disability on
summary judgment).
114. See, e.g., Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing paramedic plaintiff's claim that depression substantially limited activity of
working because plaintiff at most showed it interfered with her ability to do that
particular job); Tudyman v. United Air Lines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 746 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(finding plaintiff who was disqualified from flight attendant's job due to weight condition
did not have a statutory disability because he was "only prevented from having a single
job").
115. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999).
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individual a more general disadvantage in his or her search for
satisfactory employment. 116
The influence of the charity/benevolence model of thinking about disability
is apparent in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning. Those with disabilities are
different, separate, and in need of special help. Given that point of view, it is not
at all surprising that the result of disability discrimination litigation has been
restrictions on the class of persons who are entitled to seek the protection of the
acts. The unfortunate side effect has been the increase or at least reinforcement
of the "us versus them" mentality that permeated the historic treatment of
individuals with disabilities.
E. The Supreme Court'sADA DecisionsInterpreting

"SubstantiallyLimits"
In 1998, the Supreme Court issued Bragdon v. Abbott,"' its first decision
addressing the proper interpretation of "substantially limits" under the ADA and
the EEOC regulations. Based on Bragdon, ADA advocates had some
justification to believe that the Supreme Court signaled a broad interpretation of
the definition of disability that might avoid some of the unintended consequences
of the individualized assessment approach. After the Court's 1999 "substantially
limits" trilogy, however, the inescapable conclusion is that the hard-won fight
for individualized assessment has backfired.
1. The Promise of Bragdon v. Abbott
In Bragdon,the Court seemingly endorsed an expansive view of how courts
should approach the issue of who is entitled to proceed on protected class status.
The impairment at issue was asymptomatic HIV infection, and the major life
activity alleged to be substantially limited was reproduction."' Reproduction is

116. Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 933-34 (4th Cir. 1986). This language has
been quoted so often, it has literally become a mantra invoked by courts to emphasize the
appropriateness of a narrow interpretation of the ADA. See, e.g., Francis v. City of
Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286, 287 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Forrisito support reasoning
that "simple physical characteristic" like weight does not constitute a disability);
Williams v. City of Charlotte, 899 F. Supp. 1484, 1487-88 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (quoting
Forrisiin support of decision that sleep disorder did not place plaintiff sufficiently
outside the norm so as to qualify as a disability). Even among commentators generally
supportive of a strong ADA, this idea that disqualification from one job is not sufficient
to warrant coverage under the Act seems to be accepted. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
117. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
118. Id. at 628, 635-37.
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not listed as a major life activity in the regulations." 9 The Court interpreted the
basic statutory provision regarding "major life activities" to include all activities
of comparative importance or significance to human life, and further concluded
that the list of such activities contained in the regulations was illustrative, not
exhaustive.120 Based on comparative importance, the Court concluded
that
121
reproduction fell "well within" the phrase "major life activity.'

The Court also interpreted "substantially limits" to extend to an
asymptomatic disease that, in the case of HIV, affected reproductive activity
because of a risk of transmission of the disease to either the reproductive partner
or the child that might be conceived. 122 While declining to rule that HIV
infection was a disability per se, the Court found the plaintiff to have satisfied
the "substantially limits" requirement merely by her unchallenged testimony that
her BIV infection controlled her decision not to have a child."u
In some respects, this latter aspect of the decision was most hopeful for
advocates of a broader definition of disability. The Court's analysis did not limit
effect to actual physical function but rather seemed to encompass a more global
consideration of effect on the individual's personal and social functioning.'2 4
In the months just prior to the Court's 1999 trilogy of decisions, at least one
federal court saw Bragdon as signaling a "generous" and "forgiving"
construction of "substantially limits," at least for purposes of summary
judgment. 125 Some commentators characterized the decision as a good, though
incomplete, step2 6in the right direction toward opening the courtroom doors to
ADA plaintiffs.

119. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
120. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639.
121. Id. at 638.
122. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-41 (1998).
123. Id. at 641.
124. Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent-took an actual physical function impairment
approach to interpreting substantial limitation. He took issue with the majority's finding
that the plaintiffs testimony that she decided not to have children because of her HIV
infection was sufficient to meet the evidentiary burden for substantial limitation. In his
view, the plaintiff should have been required to present specific evidence regarding how
HIV had made her less able to actually engage in sexual intercourse, give birth to a child,
and perform manual tasks associated with child rearing. Id. at 658-62 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The majority relied on statistics that addressed the risk of transmission to
sexual partners and children born of HIV-infected mothers, not on evidence that HIV
positive individuals are less physically able to engage in the activities associated with
reproduction. Id. at 640-41.
125. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434,438,440 (D. Del.
1999), vacating971 F. Supp. 851 (D. Del. 1997). This court in fact had earlier granted
the employer summary judgment on the grounds the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient
evidence of limitation.
126. See Colker, supra note 11, at 133 (suggesting that Bragdon sets forth a
general framework for considering ADA cases that might stem the trend toward granting
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Any such advance appears to have been short-lived. Almost exactly one
year after Bragdon, the Court issued decisions in the "substantially limits"
trilogy of cases: Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines, Inc.,127Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 28 and
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg.'29 Rather than continuing along the lines
Bragdon appeared to set, these three cases reflect a restrictive view of the ADA's
scope. More importantly, they do little to curb the tendency of courts to
substitute their own normative views of "substantial" limitation for jury
determination of the plaintiff's claim. By requiring every disability claimant to
present evidence of the limitations he or she actually experiences, the Court in
these decisions endorsed the transformation of individualized assessment from
a shield against biased decisionmaking into a weapon to be used against
disability law claimants.
2. Substantial Limitation Viewed as an Aggressive Gatekeeper
Sutton contains the bulk of the Court's rationale for endorsing a restrictive
view of the definition of disability. Factually, it also reflects one of the most
challenging questions about the breadth of the ADA. The plaintiffs in Sutton
alleged their vision was impaired, and that the impairment in the absence of
corrective lenses rendered them unable to perform numerous basic activities like
driving a car or watching television.' If the Court endorsed a reading of the
ADA that extended to these plaintiffs, then potentially every person in the
country who wears eyeglasses could have an ADA claim.'
There is no

question that this potential heavily influenced the Court's decision.
The Court in Sutton held that a plaintiff claiming disability must establish
that her physical or mental impairment substantially limits one or more of her
major life activities when the impairment is viewed in its corrected state. 32 The

summary judgment seen in the lower courts, but the case failed to adequately address
issues of burdens of proof).

127. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
128. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
129. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
130. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143.
131. The plaintiffs in Sutton had 20/200 or worse in one eye and 20/400 or worse
in the left eye. Id. Because the Court held that their vision was to be considered in its
corrected state, we are left to speculate as to what lines might be drawn between persons

with uncorrected bad vision. For instance, would 20/100 be a substantial limitation?
Anything less than 20/20? If the latter, then certainly every person in need of corrective
lenses would meet the definition of disability. As Justice Stevens points out in his
dissenting opinion, however, the number of people who are likely to lose employment
because they do not have 20/20 uncorrected vision is not likely to be that large. Id. at
2159, 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Arguments that focus simply on the raw number
of people with a disorder or condition are, or at least should be, beside the point.
132. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999).
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Court offered two rationales for this decision. First, the language in the
33
definition section uses the present indicative verb fonn---"substantially limits.
This requires "that a person be presently-not potentially or hypotheticallysubstantially limited .

.

.,13' and the statute emphasizes individualized

assessment of disability in every case. 35 If courts and employers had to
determine what the employee's impairment would be in an uncorrected state, the
Court feared they would rely on generalized information about how such
impairments usually affect people and decide that an individual
had a disability
36
simply because that person had a particular impairment.
Second and, according to the Court, "critically," Congress's findings
37
identified only "some 43,000,000 Americans" as having a disability.1
According to the Court, the primary source for this figure, a report issued in
1988 by the National Council on the Handicapped (now the National Council on
Disability) took a functional limitation approach to defining who had a disability
--"difficulty performing one or more basic physical activities"--rather than a
"health conditions approach" that focused on all conditions that affect health and
functioning. 31 The Court acknowledged that the figure used in that report, 37.3
million, was lower than the figure used by Congress, but argued the source of the
exact number was not as important as the fact that only studies using a functional
limitation approach placed the number with disabilities anywhere near the 43

133. Id. at 2141 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)(1994)) (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. The Court noted statutory language that required disability be evaluated "with
respect to an individual" and that impairments substantially limit "major life activities
of such individual." Id. at 2147 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)). The Court
considered the interpretation urged by the plaintiff and the administrative agencies to

disregard this language by asking the employer to speculate about what affect the
impairment might have if the plaintiff did not take the corrective measures. Id.
136. Id. The Court also suggested that adopting the EEOC position would mean
employers could not take mitigating measures into account in any respect whatsoever,
even if those mitigating measures themselves caused the employee severe side effects.

Id.
137. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)).
138. Id. at 2148 (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD
OF INDEPENDENCE

(1988) [hereinafter ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE]). ONTHE
itself relied on a Census Bureau report, which defined

THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE

disability as "has difficulty performing one or more basic physical activities . . .
includ[ing] seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, using stairs, lifting or carrying, getting
around outside, getting around inside, and getting into or out of bed." ON THE
THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE 9 (1988) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
CENSUS, DISABILITY, FUNCTIONAL LIMITATION, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:

1984/85, 2 (1985)). The Court in Sutton noted that definition suggested 37.3 million
people in this country had a disability. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148.
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million figure used by Congress.'39 By choosing to include such a figure in the
ADA, the Court reasoned, Congress gave content to the terms of the Act.'4 °
In the Court's view, Congress thus had some identifiable group in mind
when it passed the ADA, and the Court's role was to interpret the Act
accordingly. The Act might still cover individuals who could take advantage of
mitigating measures, but only if they established a residual substantial functional
limitation: "The use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine
whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the
limitations' 41an individual with an impairment actually faces are substantially
liniting.'
The Act's emphasis on individualized assessment, therefore, means no
plaintiff has a disability under the first prong of the definition of disability until
that person proves what limitations she personally and actually experiences in42
the present. In another case in the trilogy, Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
which did not involve a correctable condition, the Court somewhat expanded on
the amount of proof a disability plaintiff would have to present.
The plaintiff in Albertsons, Inc. had a vision condition called amblyopia,
which weakened the vision in his left eye to the point that he was considered to
have monocular vision. 43 Although the Court later conceded that most
monocular plaintiffs would be found to have a disability and that defendants
probably would not often challenge that status, it nonetheless made a point of

criticizing the Ninth Circuit for failing to "pay much heed" to the "statutory

139. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148. For contrast, the Court looked at two different
sets of figures that did not limit themselves to individuals with actual functional
limitations. First, the "health conditions approach," which looked to the number of
people who had some condition that affected health or functioning, under which the
coverage figure ranged to about 160 million people. Id. (citing NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 10-11 (1986)). Second, the Court looked to more
general statistics that placed the number of people with vision impairments alone at 100
million, id. at 2149 (citing NATIONAL ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., VISION RESEARCH-A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003, 7 (1998)), that
placed the number of people with hearing impairments at 28 million, id. (citing
NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, NATIONAL STRATEGIC RESEARCH PLAN: HEARING AND

HEARING IMPAIRMENT v (1996)), and that placed the number of people with high blood
pressure at 50 million. Id. (citing William Tindall, Stalkinga Silent Killer,Hypertension,
BUSINESS &HEALTH, Aug. 1998, at 37).

140. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
141. Id. In Murphy, the other mitigating measures case in the trilogy, the Court
also framed the inquiry in the present sense. Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 119 U.S. 2133 (1999).
The plaintiff in Murphy had high blood pressure that was treated with medication. Id.
at 2136. The Court suggested the relevant question in such a case was whether the
effects of the plaintiff's impairment persisted in his present, medicated state, or whether
side effects from the medication constituted substantial limitations. Id. at 2137.
142. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).

143. Id. at 2165-66.
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obligation" of individualized assessment of each case.'
The Court then
downplayed this by suggesting it did not intend the burden to be "onerous" and
reasserted its view of the proper inquiry: "We simply hold that the Act requires
monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act's protection, to prove a
disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their
own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial."'45
Despite the Court's attempt to characterize the evidentiary burden as not
onerous, the practical consequence of the trilogy is that every disability claimant
will need to present specific evidence outlining what he can and cannot do at the
threshold stage of litigation. Unfortunately, no further guidance is given in any
of the three 4cases
about what amount of evidence meets the level of
6
substantiality.
The outcome in the trilogy is likely to be harshly criticized by supporters
of the ADA. In fact, one person who had been involved in drafting the ADA
was quoted as saying the result was "absurd" because it means that a person
could be "disabled enough to be fired from a job but not disabled enough to
challenge the firing."' 47 The trilogy is not, however, to blame for this absurdity.

The language of the ADA is. The absurdity was built into the ADA through its
normative definition of disability.
The Court majority can be criticized for overrelying on an estimate of the
number of people with disabilities, an estimate whose validity was questioned
by its own sources. 48 Congress's reference to 43 million individuals with
disabilities should be seen as a signal of inclusion, not exclusion. The finding
itself goes on to note that "this number is increasing as the population as a whole
is growing older,"'149 reflecting that Congress expected the number in the
protected class to expand. Further, the mere fact that the figure mentioned is as

144. Id. at2164.
145. Id. at 2169.

146. The plaintiffs in Sutton failed on the substantiality question because their
corrected eyesight was 20/20. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2143
(1999). They did not argue that the use of lenses in and of themselves posed a substantial
limitation. Id. The issue presented on certiorari in Murphy asked only whether high
blood pressure was a disability per se. Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136
(1999). The Court accordingly sidestepped any consideration of whether a plaintiff s
medication or any side effects of that medication supported a finding of disability. Id.
Finally, the plaintiff in Albertsons, Inc. lost on the separate issue of whether he was a
"qualified" individual with a disability. Albertsons, Inc., 119 S. Ct. at 2169. Summary
judgment for the employer was reinstated and no further consideration of the plaintiffs
disability status was made. Id.
147. Sensibly Reading the DisabilityLaw, CHi. TRm., June 24, 1999, at 28 (quoting

comment of Professor Chai Feldblum).
148. ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 138, at 12-13.
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
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large as 43 million reflects how far reaching Congress saw the protected class
at the time the ADA was passed.
The majority can also be criticized, as reflected in the dissenting opinion, 50
for taking a cramped view of the reach of a civil rights act. Other civil rights
statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'15 serve as precedent
for the idea that the scope of the statute is not fixed by what was specifically
contemplated by Congress at the time the legislation was passed. 52 The Court
itself only a year ago extended the reach of Title II of5 3the ADA beyond the
context set out inthe findings and purposes of the Act.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that Congress directed courts to include only
those who are "substantially limited" in a major life activity, and the Supreme
Court's approach is at least plausibly within the intent and language of the Act."

150. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2156-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority
for ignoring its broal remedial approach to construing civil rights statutes).
151. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e17 (Supp. HI 1996).
152. The legislative history of Title VII indicates it was primarily concerned with
discrimination in hiring, but the litigation history of Title VII has primarily involved
claims of discrimination by individuals who are already employed in the workplace. See
John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. RFV. 983, 1015, 1028 n.140 (1991).
153. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). Title II
prohibits discrimination by public entities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994). In Yeskey, the
Court held that the protections of Title IIof the ADA extend to individuals with
disabilities incarcerated in penal institutions. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 213. Pennsylvania
argued that the statute was ambiguous as to the coverage of penal institutions, in part
because the findings and purposes section of the Act did not mention such facilities. Id.
at 211-12. The Court rejected the significance of the fact that it would possibly be
extending the statute to a context not envisioned by Congress: "As we have said before,
the fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."' Id. at 212 (quoting Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Irnrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,499 (1985) (internal citation omitted)). Arguably,
the interpretation issue presented in Yeskey is distinguishable from that presented in
Sutton. The Court was interpreting a term in Yeskey, "public entity," which had no
implicit message of limitation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(l)(B) (1994) (defining "public
entity" to include "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government"). However, Yeskey stands
alongside Bragdon as reflecting a broad interpretation of the reach of the ADA prior to
the 1999 trilogy.
154. Another likely criticism of the majority's interpretation is that it does not
mention the House and Senate Reports that suggest Congress intended the first prong of
the definition of disability be applied without regard to mitigating measures. See H.R.
REP. No. 101-485(III), at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S.REP.
No. 101-116, at 23 (1989). There is also language in the Senate Report, however, that
describes medical conditions "under control" as "not currently substantially limit[ing]
major life activities." S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24. This language appears in the Senate's
discussion of the coverage of the third prong of the definition of disability, the "regarded
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8

26

2000]

Anderson: Anderson: Deserving Disabilities:
"DESERVING DISABILITIES"

As Part I discusses, the trilogy brings into focus the fact that our vision of
disability under the ADA needs more revision than simply extending it to
individuals with mitigatable impairments.
HI. THE PARADOXES OF DEFINING DISABILITIES AS ONLY THOSE
THAT SUBSTANTIALLY LIMIT

As Part II demonstrated, "substantial limitation" was added to the
vocational rehabilitation statutes to emphasize to States the need to extend
training and education services to individuals with severe disabilities. Congress
incorporated the "substantial limitation" concept into Section 504's broad
prohibition on discrimination against individuals with disabilities without any
reflection on the requirement's purposes or consequences. As a result,
confirmed by the 1999 trilogy, courts perform the role of "disability experts"
much like that played by vocational experts under the old vocational
rehabilitation acts, in which they decide which among those with physical and
mental impairments are intended to benefit from the statute.
The difference from the old vocational rehabilitation acts, of course, is that
now these "experts" determine what basic rights an individual has in society,
rather than merely whether that person is entitled to participate in rehabilitation
programs. Worse, these new experts are subject to a whole new set of influences
that did not pertain to the vocational rehabilitation programs-in particular, the
traditional reluctance of the judicial system to intrude on the business judgment
of employers.
Admittedly, disability is arguably different from other civil rights protected
characteristics, and that without this inquiry it cannot as readily be determined
whether someone in fact has the characteristic that is protected (the theory being
that many disabilities are "hidden"' 55 and that everyone has a race but not
everyone has a disability). Further, without this type of inquiry, it would be too
easy for someone to "select into" disability status. 156 Both of these premises,

as" prong. S. RP. No. 101-116. How Congress envisioned the handling of controlled
impairments is, therefore, not without debate.
155. Locke, supra note 11, at 115; see also PELKA, supra note 44, at 155-56
(defining "hidden" disabilities to include impairments not apparent to a casual or
uninformed observer, such as head injury, fibromyalgia, lupus, AIDS, and the early
stages of multiple sclerosis).
156. This argument seems to underlie the reasoning of courts that employ the "one
particular job" rationale to dismiss disability discrimination claims. For example, the
Second Circuit asserted that the Rehabilitation Act regulations could not be "interpreted
to ... include working at the specific job of one's choice." Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212,
215 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739, 754 (C.D. Cal.
1984)). While these courts ostensibly rely on the regulations' language in support of this
reasoning, in fact they appear to have developed a test that requires plaintiffs to meet an
evidentiary standard of showing their general unemployability. See Locke, supra note
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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however, depend on the legitimacy of mandating that only those persons with
"substantial limitations" are properly afforded protection under the statute. 157
This Part addresses the legitimacy of that mandate. First, the conflict
created among various goals of the statute from the inclusion of "substantially
limits" in the definition of disability and how it inevitably allows courts to make
value judgments about the "deserving disabled" in a way that undermines the
concept of disability as a group-based civil rights issue, is discussed. Two
examples, blindness and carpal tunnel syndrome, are then used to demonstrate

how these inconsistencies affect the actual application of the statute.
Next, this Part demonstrates that the current ADA perpetuates the notion of
disability discrimination law as granting "special rights" because of the statute's
inability to support a coherent defense to claims it is anti-efficient. Finally, this
Part concludes by addressing the "regarded as" prong, the supposed safety valve
to ensure that the ADA reaches all forms of disability discrimination, which
arguably should resolve many of the conflicts raised, but which does not because
it is also undermined by the concept of substantial limitation.

A. Conflicts Between IndividualizedDeterminationof
Protected Class Status, Anti-Stereotyping, andDisabilityas a GroupBased Civil Right
Arguments are sure to be raised that the Supreme Court's 1999 trilogy of
decisions undermines the goals of the ADA. 58 The results of the 1999 trilogy

11, at 122-23.
157. The argument that people will be able to "select into" disability status also
ignores the language of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act that extends protection only to
"qualified" individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) ("No covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability .

. . .").

The qualification inquiry then focuses on what are the essential

functions of the job in question and whether the individual with a disability is able to
perform them with or without reasonable accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(1994). The EEOC itself seems to have problems separating the issue of disability from
the issue of qualification. Its interpretive guidance to the definition of "substantially
limits" gives as examples of persons who do not have disabilities, a person with a vision
impairment who cannot fly a commercial airliner but who can co-pilot the airliner or fly
other types of planes, and a professional baseball pitcher with a "bad elbow" who can no
longer throw a baseball. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2, app. § 1630.20) (1999). Both examples
seem to more properly raise issues of whether these people are qualified because they are
unable to perform essential functions of the jobs in question, rather than whether they
have a disability. Even the court in E.E. Black recognized that such particular job
arguments would be appropriately handled through the "qualified" analysis. See E.E.
Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (D. Haw. 1980) (rejecting analogy that
person not hired as running back for Dallas Cowboys could have disability claim unless
the single job rule was adopted).
158. See, e.g., Susan J. McGolrick, DisabilitiesDiscrimination: Supreme Court's
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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certainly highlight an inherent paradox in defining disability by reference to
impairments that "substantially limit" major life activities. A statute designed
to focus on ability and eliminate stereotyping of individuals with disabilities
requires those individuals to focus on their limitations in order to convince a
court they are impaired enough to be allowed to assert protection of a civil right.
But does the result of the trilogy really undermine the overarching goals of the
disability movement?
As previously discussed,' 59 disability advocates wanted to move away from
categorical treatment of "the disabled." They sought means to attack stereotypes
about disability. They sought to have society speak of "individuals with
disabilities," separating the person from the impairment. Arguably, the ADA
after the 1999 trilogy accomplishes that separation. The Supreme Court's view
does not presume that a person who must be assisted is a person with a disability.
No stereotypes are applied about what it means to use a wheelchair, to rely on
medications, or so on.
The irony of individualized assessment here cannot be denied. Disability
civil rights laws were supposed to reflect the movement away from viewing
individuals with disabilities by what they cannot do. Yet, the anti-stereotyping
rationale supporting these laws has resulted in individuals having to place
particular attention on their limitations before reaching the merits of their claim.
Take for example a person with insulin-dependent diabetes who is currently
able to control the effects of the disease by taking insulin injections. Prior to the
1999 trilogy, disability advocates, with the support of the EEOC and eight of the
nine circuit courts of appeals that had addressed the issue, considered that the
"proper" interpretation of whether this individual has a disability to be
determined without regard to insulin injections. 160 According to the position
adopted by the majority in Sutton, however, the "proper" interpretation requires
only consideration of either the residual effect of the diabetes itself after insulin
6
has been ingested or the effect of having to take insulin-injections for diabetes.1 '
If the diabetes is fully controlled by insulin injections, the individual presumably

Three ADA Decisions Disappoint Disability Rights Advocates, 132 DAILY L. REP.

(BNA), July 12, 1999, at C-1 (reporting reactions of disability rights advocates who
describe Supreme Court trilogy as disappointing and failing to understand the policy
implications of the Act).
159. See supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
160. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2153 & n.1 (1999)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing circuit cases that at the time of the Sutton decision had

stated positions on the EEOC's interpretation of the mitigating measures issue); 29
C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999). The Department of Justice also issued similar
guidance for application to Titles II and III of the ADA. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A §
35.104 (1998); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B § 36.104 (1998).
161. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
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would have only a qualifying disability if the residual effects of the insulin shots
162
themselves substantially limit one or more major life activities.
The previous majority view inevitably required speculation as to what
degree of impairment the plaintiff would have if the assistive device were not
used. The plaintiff had to create a hypothetical regarding what his condition
would be if insulin were not available or ineffective. 63 That approach arguably
did something disability rights advocates sought to eliminate-it placed the
emphasis on diagnosis rather than on effect on the individual. While more
disability cases passed the initial threshold, such an approach sacrificed the
integrity of the process. Individualized assessment was essentially lost as
arguments focused on categorical expectations regarding the effects of the
alleged impairment."a
The post-Sutton approach retains the emphasis on individualized assessment
but poses a difficult burden for the plaintiff with diabetes. Dependency on
insulin is much easier to conceive of as having an "effect" on major life activities
than as having a "substantial effect.' 61 The Court's narrow construction of the
ADA will probably exclude this plaintiff because she cannot prove she is
sufficiently impaired.
Justice Ginsburg in her concurring opinion in Sutton offers an additional
rationale to support this narrow construction of "substantially limits" based on
the statement in the findings and purposes of the ADA that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority ... subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society."'' 6 She found this statement "inconsistent with the
enormously embracing definition of disability" urged by the plaintiffs in
Sutton. 67

162. Id. at 2147.
163. See Erica Worth Harris, ControlledImpairments under the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: A Searchfor theMeaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REv. 575, 58182 (1998) (arguing EEOC interpretation requires contemplation of "potential medical
diagnosis of a disability's effect in a hypothetical world").
164. See, e.g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding insulin-dependent diabetic was substantially limited because of effects of
untreated diabetes on the body). In Baert, the Seventh Circuit was willing to accept the
general proposition that insulin-dependent diabetics would lapse into a coma when not
treated with insulin. Id. After making that finding, the court pointed out that the plaintiff
in that particular case had a medical history that included hospitalization when he was
not taking his insulin, but the court had already concluded that the plaintiff survived
summary judgment on the general characteristics of insulin-dependent diabetes alone.
Id.
165. For instance, having to maintain a regular schedule of injections would affect
"caring for oneself." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
166. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2152 (1999) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994)).
167. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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The apparent purpose of the "discrete and insular" characterization was not
necessarily to further define the protected class, but rather to overrule the
Supreme Court's ruling in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center'68 that
individuals with disabilities do not possess "quasi-suspect" status for purposes
of constitutional scrutiny.'69 In Cleburne,the Court concluded that individuals
with mental retardation were too "different, immutably so," from each other, and
States' need to respond to those differences too great, to grant them as a group
heightened class status. 70 By labeling individuals with disabilities a discrete and
insular minority subject to political powerlessness, Congress apparently
attempted to "ratchet up" equal protection rights for individuals with disabilities
by taking advantage
of the power granted it under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
171
Amendment.
Justice Ginsburg's observation reflects, however, something of the uneasy
relationship between the kind of individualized determination of disability
advocated by the social construct model of disability and the treatment of
individuals with disabilities as a protected class for purposes of civil rights
protections. The social construct theory of disability denies that there is a
precise definition of disability and rejects attempts to label individuals "disabled"
because they have some impairment.'72 The ADA implements this theory by
refusing to consider anyone as having a disability without an analysis of the

168. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
169. See Robert E. Rains, A Pre-Historyofthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct and
Some InitialThoughts as to Its ConstitutionalImplications,11 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv.
185, 198-99 (1992). Professor Rains suggests that Congress appeared to be using the
"Ratchet Theory" from Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), which held that the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to increase but not restrict or dilute equal
protection guarantees. Id. at 201 n.101. Professor Rains notes that the theory had never
before been used by Congress to create a quasi-suspect or suspect class by statute. Id.
at 202.
170. City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 442-46.
171. See Rains, supra note 169, at 202. The effectiveness of this maneuver is
questionable in light of recent Supreme Court rulings restricting the reach of Congress's
Section 5 powers. See FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999) (holding that Congress exceeded its Section 5
powers in enacting the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of
1992); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (holding that Congress
exceeded its Section 5 powers in enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993). Full development of the scope of Congress's power to enact the ADA as Section

5 legislation is beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of the equal protection
issues prior to the Court's recent decisions, see Lisa A. Montanaro, Comment, The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Will The Court Get the Hint? Congress'Attempt to
Raise the StatusofPersons with Disabilitiesin EqualProtection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV.
621 (1995).
172. Drimmer, supra note 29, at 1355; Eichhom, supra note 14, at 1412-13.
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degree of the individual's personal limitations. In this regard, disability need not
be seen as different from other protected characteristics.
For example, many excellent critiques have argued that race is itself socially
constructed.' 73 There is no substantial objective basis for labeling anyone as
having a particular race. 74 As with the ADA's prohibition on discrimination
based on disability, the statutory prohibitions against discrimination based on
race are founded in a rejection of stereotypes and arbitrary barriers to
employment. 75 Yet, in race discrimination cases, the extent to which race has
impacted a plaintiff's employment opportunities is not examined. Further,
discrimination claims are not rejected simply because they are brought by
individuals who, because of socioeconomic status or skin tone, may have been
able to avoid many of the limitations race places upon opportunity. 76 In other
words, we are willing to presume the validity of the value judgment inherent in
limiting use of race characteristics in employment decisions regardless of the
strength of the status claim of the particular plaintiff.177
At the same time, "discrete and insular" implies a unity of group identity
that can be traced to a particular (though arbitrary) characteristic that is the
source of the political powerlessness experienced by the group. 78 The

173. For a recent work that addresses not only how race and its relation to
intelligence has been socially constructed, but also how the same is true for mental
retardation, see ROBERT L. HAYMAN, THE SMART CuLTuRE (1998).
174. HAYMAN, supra,note 173, at 127-29 (describing the weak scientific basis for
the concept of "race").
175. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-31 (1971) (articulating the
intent of Congress in enacting Title VII as removal of artificial and arbitrary barriers to

employment).
176. The same is true for discrimination based on sex, where we do not, for
example, reject the claims of male plaintiffs who allege sexual harassment despite the law
of sexual harassment having been initially justified as one which addresses unequal
power between the sexes. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75
(1998) (allowing male plaintiff to proceed with claim that male co-workers sexually
harassed him). In Oncale, the Supreme Court noted that male-on-male sexual harassment
was "assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title
VII." Id. at 79.
177. The Supreme Court emphasized this in Oncale when it directed courts to
apply the statutory prohibition on "discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex" to any sexual
harassment case. Id. at 79-80 (alteration and omissions in original). The Court reasoned
that "statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal
concerns of our legislatures by which we are governed." Id.
178. For example, the Supreme Court has described alienage as a "prime example"
of a discrete and insular minority protected from denial of government benefits absent
compelling justification. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372, 374 (1974).
While "aliens" may not share similar cultures or color of skin, they have a group identity
by virtue of their non-native, non-citizen status.
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characteristic matters in defining the class, not the extent to which a particular
individual holds that characteristic. If relevant, the manifestations of the
characteristic or extent to which an individual holds that characteristic are
considered later in the process, when evaluating the lawfulness of the employer's
conduct.'79 By emphasizing the degree of deviance from the "norm" in defining
disability, however, the ADA perpetuates the notion that disability is not really
180
a group-based issue but rather a personal issue involving individual "flaws."
This ignores the fundamental point well articulated by Professor Catherine
Lanctot that "[p]rejudice is not tailored to a person's particular set of symptoms
[and] is not determined by the degree to which a medical condition substantially
limits a major life activity. Prejudice stems from over-generalizations, myths
and stereotypes, unwarranted assumptions and fear.''.
Professor Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., who drafted the original version of the
ADA introduced in Congress in 1988, has suggested that "protected class" under
the Act has been analytically misperceived as "special protected class."' 18 2 In
other words, courts have been unable to separate the historic view of individuals
with disabilities as objects of pity and charity, such that any actions taken to
benefit them are special benefits, which in turn invokes long standing judicial
hostility toward "special rights. '8 3 While he argues that this is a misconstruction

179. Again analogizing to the law of sexual discrimination, that law does not ask
about the sexual characteristics of the plaintiff in order to establish that person's right to
assert Title VII. See Oncale, 523 U.S. 75, at 78-79 (rejecting standards that would have
inquired into the sexual characteristics of both plaintiff and defendant before allowing
a Title VII sexual harassment claim). However, the law does recognize that sexual
characteristics might be relevant to decisions about particular jobs under the bona fide
occupational qualifications exception to Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994);
see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (holding that all-male prison may
categorically refuse to hire women for "contact positions" within the facility because of
concerns about possible risk to other inmates from violence directed toward female
guards by convicted sex offenders).
180. Current EEOC Commissioner Paul Steven Miller has noted the difficulty in
persuading society to accept disability as a civil rights issue because society does not
view individuals with disabilities as sharing common characteristics. See Paul Steven
Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigmfor the Twenty-First Century: The
Expansionof CivilRightsBeyond Race, Gender,andAge, 1U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. 511,
521 (1998). He focuses his analysis on resulting employer attitudes. He argues that as

long as disability is perceived as an individual "flaw," employers are less likely to
recognize that their actions are affected by negative stereotypes. Id. His point applies
more generally to the ADA itself. The ADA undermines viewing individuals with
disabilities as a group by using substantial limitation to create classes within the class of
disability.
181. See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 337.
182. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 568.
183. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 568-69.
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of the ADA as written,' in reality the structure of the ADA perpetuates such
thinking by drawing distinctions between impairments based on the degree of
effect. Consider in that regard the two examples discussed in the next section,
which would probably be treated the same today as they were before Sutton was
decided: blindness and carpal tunnel syndrome.

B. A Tale of Two Stereotypes
An individual who is completely unable to see has no difficulty meeting the
definition of substantially limited in the ADA regulations because she is
"[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform."' 85 Even after Sutton, a simple assertion of the inability
to see will probably suffice to meet the threshold requirement that a plaintiff be
a member of a protected class. If litigation occurs over the impact of blindness
on the individual's life, it will occur in the battle over whether this person is a
qualified individual with a disability and whether the employer
could reasonably
86
accommodate that individual without undue hardship.1
On the other hand, a plaintiff who alleges carpal tunnel syndrome in his
wrists will be required to specifically establish that this characteristic had some
actual and substantial impact on his life. This is true even in cases in which the
employer explicitly or implicitly concedes that the plaintiff's physical condition
was the basis for the adverse employment decision.' 87 The defendant is likely

184. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 571-72. Ih particular, Burgdorf suggests that the
third prong of the definition of disability, the "regarded as" prong, should be "properly"
understood to cover situations when an employer "purposefully inflicted a negative
consequence upon an individual because of a physical or mental impairment (whether
real or perceived)." Burgdorf, supra note 11, it571-72. As a matter of policy, this
makes sense, but as I later discuss, it ignores the language of the third prong which
incorporates the "substantial limitation" language of the first prong. See infra notes 21618 and accompanying text. Under the revision I propose, Burgdorf's conception of the
third prong will be accomplished because the substantial limitation requirement is
eliminated.
185. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1)(i) (1999).
186. See White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 (10th Cir. 1995) (assuming
plaintiff established genuine issue of material fact regarding blindness as a disability and
evaluating summary judgment issues only as to plaintiff's qualifications and reasonable
accommodations).
187. See Wilmarth v. City of Santa Rosa, 945 F. Supp. 1271, 1274, 1277 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (finding plaintiff with carpal tunnel syndrome failed to establish either actual
or perceived disability despite employer acknowledging it believed plaintiff was unable
to perform the position she held); Khan v. Cook County, No. 96 C 1113, 1997 WL
370199, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 1997) (court found employee with carpal tunnel
syndrome not impaired enough to state an ADA claim despite employer having refused
to allow employee back to work until all medical restrictions related to his condition were
lifted).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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to move for summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim,'

in response to which

the plaintiff will need to convince the judge that (1) the pain and physical
limitations associated with carpal tunnel syndrome are actual; and (2) whatever
loss of major life activity the plaintiff alleges is important enough, both in terms
of the status of the life activity and the degree of limitation.' 89 Even if the
plaintiff tries to avoid this burden of proving an actual disability and instead
alleges that the employer regarded him as having a disability under the third
prong of the definition,' 90 he will still have to show the employer's perception
of his condition met the substantiality requirement.19 '
Stereotypes about disability can still be seen at work in either case. In the
case of blindness, the historic presumption that absence of a function equals
disability is employed.'9 2 Although the statute purports to require a case-by-case
analysis, the individual's blindness in and of itself will in most every case
answer that inquiry.9 3 In contrast, the carpal tunnel claimant faces a

188. Cf Colker, supra note 11, at 107-08 (reporting the success of ADA
defendants in obtaining dismissal of claims at trial court level).
189. The Sixth Circuit provides a recent example of how exacting courts can be
regarding the plaintiff's evidence of limitation in carpal tunnel cases. See McKay v.
Toyota Motor Mfg, U.S.A., Inc., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997). In McKay, the plaintiff
was an assembly line worker who lost her job after developing carpal tunnel syndrome
that limited her ability to lift over twenty pounds, use vibrating tools, and make repetitive
use of her right hand. Id. at 370. Toyota dismissed her because of excessive absences
pursuant to its medical leave policy. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff failed
to present sufficient evidence that she was significantly restricted from performing a class
of jobs, specifically manufacturing jobs. Id. at 373. The court distinguished between
light, medium, and heavy manufacturing work and characterized plaintiff's evidence as
indicating only that she was disqualified from light work:
Since plaintiffs work history at Toyota involved only light work, and she
made no showing she ever was able to perform medium or heavy work, one
is hard pressed to comprehend how she could have been regarded as a
'qualified individual' with respect to medium and heavy work.
... [A]t best, her evidence supports a conclusion that her impairment
disqualifies her from only the narrow range of assembly line manufacturing
jobs that require repetitive motion or frequent lifting ofmore than ten pounds.
Id. By characterizing the class ofjobs affected in this fashion, the Sixth Circuit was able
to dismiss the obvious and substantial degree of limitation imposed by the plaintiff's
carpal tunnel syndrome.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
191. See, e.g., Lessard v. Osram Sylvania, 175 F.3d 193, 199 (lst Cir. 1999)
(requiring plaintiff who alleges employer regarded him as substantially limited in ability
to work to show that employer believed plaintiff had an impairment that would have
excluded plaintiff from broad range ofjobs).
192. The ADA regulations provide that the inability to perform a major life activity
that can be performed by an average person in the community meets the first alternative
definition of "substantially limits." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1)(i) (1999).
193. The Supreme Court in effect acknowledged this process of defining disability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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presumption that he is not a deserving party entitled to protection from arbitrary
stereotypes that impede his ability to compete fairly in the labor market. He
must prove the extent to which his physical impairment causes his ability to
do. 9 4
perform major life activities to deviate from what the "average" person can
Except in limited cases where carpal tunnel plaintiffs can muster enough such
evidence of limitation, the impairment is simply a personal trait for which the
individual will have to bear the consequences. 95
Instead of focusing on whether the employer took the individual's physical
capabilities into account, the law diverts the issue into assessing the strength of

the individual's status claim. It is, in essence, a hunt for the "special" case. This

and lead to the "special
cannot help but invoke stereotypes about
96 disability
rights" perception Burgdorf described.

C. The ProductivityParadox Createdby "SubstantiallyLimits"
The special rights perception is influenced by another powerful force, the
traditional tension between civil rights laws and employers' "freedom" to run
their businesses in the way they see fit. This tension illustrates another of the
inconsistencies of the current definition of disability that allows employers to

when in Albertsons, Inc. it noted that it had reviewed medical literature on monocular
vision and, based on that information, suggested plaintiffs with such vision "ordinarily"
will be able to show they have a disability. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct.
2162, 2169 (1999).
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (1999) (defining "substantially limits" based
on significant restriction of a major life activity as compared to the condition, manner,
and duration under which an average person in the community can do that same activity).
195. The skepticism of courts approaching claims involving "non-traditional"
disabilities such as carpal tunnel syndrome can be seen in cases like Lamboy-LaSalle v.
Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 8 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.P.R. 1998), in which the court began its
discussion of the plaintiff's disability claim this way: "There is no rule that carpal tunnel
syndrome cannot qualify as a disability under the Act, but still a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the impairment has been substantially limiting." Id. at 125. The court
in Lamboy-LaSalle then proceeded to dismiss the claim because it found the plaintiff's
difficulties not broad enough and long-lasting enough to constitute a disability. Id.
196. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. Professor Lanctot makes a
similar point, questioning "whether the current judicial fixation on fact-sensitive medical
analyses can ever achieve [the] objective [of eradicating prejudice against people with
disabilities]." Lanctot, supra note 12, at 338. Her solution is to treat some disabilities
like blindness and diabetes, which she characterizes as "inherently substantially
limiting," as per se disabilities. See Lanctot, supra note 12, at 338. For the reasons set
out in the text of this Article, I believe such an approach furthers the idea that some
disabilities are more deserving of civil rights protections than others, which undermines
the concept of disability as a basic civil right and perpetuates the notion that these are
"special" rights.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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freely discriminate against not-impaired-enough plaintiffs who could be readily
accommodated to perform their jobs.
The tension between civil rights protections and free market concerns is
particularly strong in the disability context because the law requires employers
to make modifications to the job in order to accommodate qualified individuals
with disabilities. 97 Some of the strongest critics of the ADA argue that it
substitutes government regulation for employer discretion and forces employers
to make inefficient choices about uses of resources.' 98 These critics contend that
whereas other protected characteristics such as race and sex are largely irrelevant
to job performance, and banning job choices based on those characteristics
imposes little if any costs, disability usually involves the ability to perform ajob
and granting anti-discrimination protection based on that characteristic
necessarily restricts employers' control and flexibility.'99 Disability antidiscrimination laws in effect work as a subsidy paid by employers through
"reasonable accommodation," a subsidy likely to be bome disparately within the
labor market."°
Proponents of the ADA reply by asserting their own efficiency and
productivity arguments. Borrowing a theme from prior vocational rehabilitation
acts, Congress's findings in the ADA assert that disability discrimination "costs
the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from

197. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (defining discrimination to
include not making reasonable accommodations to known physical or mental disabilities
of otherwise qualified individual employees or applicants).
198. See Andrew Kull, The DiscriminationShibboleth, 21 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 195,
198 (1994); Mark A. Schuman, The WheelchairRamp to Serfdom: The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct, Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 495, 499-500
(1996); cf RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIscRIMINATION

LAWS 9, 28-58 (1992) (arguing that all civil rights statutes should be repealed to allow
the market to operate efficiently on its own to eliminate discrimination).
199. See Schuman, supra note 198, at 499. Schuman argues that "any regime to
forbid discrimination based on disability inevitably becomes a regime to control the
duties and performances an employer may require for ajob. The ADA has produced just
such controls, which go far beyond what was originally envisioned under earlier antidiscrimination laws." See Schuman, supra note 198, at 499.
200. See EPSTEIN, supra note 198, at 488-93. Epstein argues that disability

discrimination laws create subsidies by requiring employers to expend money to
accommodate individuals with disabilities within their workplaces when those
individuals could find work at other workplaces. See EPSTEIN, supra note 198, at 491.
He argues that it is more economical for individuals to change positions than for every
employer to redesign its workplace. See EPSTEIN, supra note 198, at 491. He further
argues that the costs imposed on employers in this fashion are ultimately borne by
consumers, including those with disabilities who are too impaired to work, such that
these individuals not only do not receive the benefit of the statute supposedly designed
to protect them, they actually subsidize the employment of others with disabilities. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 198, at 491-93.
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dependency and nonproductivity."'2 ' Commentators point out that efficiency is
not determined solely on cost of providing accommodation, but also on added
value from retaining employees and creating good will with customers. 2" They
argue that much of what is perceived about costs associated with hiring and
retaining individuals with disabilities is really the product of attitudes toward and
such persons, and not an actual assessment of their
assumptions 20about
3
productivity.

The arguments characterizing the ADA as anti-efficient directly or
indirectly seem to hold great sway with the courts. 21 Courts in particular tend
to confuse efficiency arguments with equality arguments. One illustration of this
201. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994).
202. See Blanck, supra note 14, at 879.
203. See Blanck, supra note 14, at 883-84; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First
Principles,31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 211,222 (1994) (asserting that prior assumptions that
employing individuals with disabilities could not generate efficiency gains may be

unfounded and that employers who have pioneered hiring such individuals often report
economic gains from their efforts to reconceptualize jobs and tasks in ways that enable
individuals with disabilities). Blanck and Marti have also reported on the emerging
empirical data on workplace accommodations which show the average costs of
accommodations is less than $500, and that many accommodations cost little or nothing.
See Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the
Employment Provisionsof the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 42 VILL. L. REv. 345,
377-78 (1997) (reporting on studies conducted of Sears, Roebuck & Co. and surveys by
the Job Accommodation Network).
204. The significance of efficiency concerns can be seen in courts' discussion of
the duty to provide reasonable accommodations. Judge Posner provides an excellent
example in his decision in Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep t ofAdmin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th
Cir. 1995). He first expressed his opinion about how the issue of reasonable

accommodation raises a different type of discrimination issue:
The... problematic case is that of an individual who has a vocationally
relevant disability-an impairment such as blindness or paralysis that limits
a major human capability, such as seeing or walking. In the common case in
which such an impairment interferes with the individual's ability to perform
up to the standards of the workplace, or increases the cost of employing him,
hiring and firing decisions based on that impairment are not "discriminatory"
in a sense closely analogous to employment discrimination on racial grounds.
But [Congress was] unwilling to confine the concept of disability
discrimination to cases in which the disability is irrelevant to the performance
of the disabled person's job.
Id. at 541. Posner then addressed allocations of the burden of proof regarding what
accommodations are reasonable or pose an undue hardship to the employer. See id. at
542-43. He decided that that the plaintiff bore an initial burden of showing that the cost
of the accommodation was reasonable in terms of being proportionate to the benefits
received by the plaintiff. Id. at 543. He supported this conclusion by pointing to the fact
that the findings accompanying the ADA "marketed" the Act as a "cost saver." Id. He
explained that "[t]he savings will be illusory if employers are required to expend many
more billions in accommodation that will be saved by enabling disabled people to work."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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is their insistence that the ADA could not have been intended to give employees
the right to work at the specific job of their choice.20 5 Apparently, such a rule
would somehow give employees more than equal opportunity. This thinking is
illustrated by one court's explanation of why a plaintiff s lifting impairment did
not warrant the accommodation of light-duty assignment or assignment to
another vacant position:
Plaintiff argues that such substantial accommodations are owed to
him, but not to other employees who are terminated because they lack
the ability to perform a particular job, because he is "disabled." As
defendant suggests, it arguably turns the very purpose of the ADA on
its head to require that an employer give a job preference, over all
other employees or applicants, to an individual who, while having an
impairment that affects his ability to perform one kind ofjob, is not
unable to perform a range of other comparable jobs not affected by the
impairment.2 °
In other words, the fault of the ADA lies not so much in a perception that
it increases costs to employers per se, but in the fact that it constrains the
freedom of the employer in order to convey "special rights" to a certain group
of employees. Such a viewpoint is not surprising from ajudicial system that in
other anti-discrimination contexts has developed a set of rules that largely defer
to the "legitimate business reasons" advanced by employers in defense to
charges of discrimination, especially absent direct proof of intentional
discrimination.0 7

205. See, e.g., Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (asserting that the
regulations cannot be interpreted to extend the definition of disability to working at the
specific job of one's choice); Byme v. Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992)

(citing Daley).
206. McCollough v. Atlanta Beverage Co., 929 F. Supp. 1489, 1497 (N.D. Ga.
1996).
207. The concerns that anti-discrimination law not unduly intrude on employer's
economic decisionmaking are prominently illustrated in the Supreme Court's approach
to "disparate impact" discrimination claims. Under the disparate impact approach, the
plaintiff does not need to prove he was intentionally treated differently than others based
on a protected characteristic such as race. Rather, the plaintiff can prove discrimination
by showing the employer used some facially neutral criteria in the employment process
that had the effect of disqualifying a statistically greater number of people who had a
protected characteristic such as race in common. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)
(1994); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The Supreme Court
in Wards Cove made this type of claim particularly difficult to prove by requiring the
plaintiff to identify the specific employment practice that caused the disparity. Wards
Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-58. The Court expressed concern that otherwise employers could
be held liable for "the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances
in the composition of their work forces." Id. at 657 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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The paradox of the argument made by efficiency critics who urge a narrow
reading of the ADA is that, following their view, the only purpose of the law
would then be to force employers to accommodate the most impaired individuals
in society, whose disabilities presumably would require more substantial
accommodations. There is a similar paradox inherent in the argument of
efficiency supporters of the ADA, who urge the productivity benefits of the
ADA in bringing the severely disabled into the workforce while ignoring the
productivity losses incurred by the less severely impaired who may still be fired
at will. This may be a carryover of the old vocational rehabilitation concern that
the most marginalized among people with disabilities receive services, or it may
be an acceptance of the idea that courts should limit their intrusion into
employment decisions. Either way, the inconsistency undermines the concept
of disability as a basic civil rights issue.
Such a construction of disability discrimination law allows employers to
pass certain employees along onto other employers, increasing the likelihood that
these impaired but not impaired enough employees will be limited to part-time
or other low paying types of employment, if they can find any employment at all.
An example of this phenomenon can be seen in a Seventh Circuit case in which
the plaintiff was fired from her job teaching special education students because
she had a relapse of symptoms associated with her diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia.2 8 The Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff was not
substantially limited in the major life activity of working in large part because
she had found another teaching job.2' The court ignored the fact that the
plaintiffs other teaching position was only that of a substitute teacher. 1 0 In
other words, because the plaintiff found some other teaching employment, that
was sufficient justification to deny her claim, without regard to the fact she was
relegated to part-time, nonpermanent employment.
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988)). Congress subsequently endorsed this approach in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, albeit including a limited exception if the employer uses

a number of employment practices that are not capable of segregation. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(I) (1994). In another part of the Wards Cove decision, the Court

cautioned that "'[c]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure
business practices,' consequently, the judiciary should proceed with care before
mandating that an employer must adopt a plaintiff's alternative selection or hiring
practice in response to a [discrimination] suit." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661 (internal
citation omitted).
208. Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 720-23 (7th
Cir. 1998).

209. Id. at 726 (reasoning that the plaintiff could not argue she was substantially
limited in her ability to work as a teacher because she "was and continued to be regularly
employed as a teacher" with another school system).
210. Id. at 723.
211. Professor Mashaw has called attention to the fact that some 700,000 people
are rejected each year in this country for Social Security Disability benefits, only a small
percentage of whom are ever again employed for substantial wages. See Mashaw, supra
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The proper focus in that case should have been on whether a teacher
experiencing symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia is a "qualified individual" for
a teaching position, not on whether this individual's schizophrenia was
substantial enough. If her symptoms could have been reasonably accommodated
without undue hardship to the employer, the result would have been more
efficient. The employee would retain her job, avoiding the costs associated with
unemployment or underemployment. The employer would avoid the error costs
associated with losing a trained employee while retaining productivity
enhancement from an employee able to perform her job properly. Moreover,
society benefits from the fully integrated value of this individual." Conversely,
if the individual cannot be reasonably accommodated, efficiency is advanced by
redirecting the individual to other employment. At that point, the arbitrary
barriers to integration have been removed and the individual is in no different
position than anyone else in society who wishes to hold a job beyond his or her
abilities.
The productivity paradox is built into the ADA. The construction of the
ADA amounts to an open invitation to courts use strict gatekeeping to combat
this perceived anti-efficient statute. The Act encourages courts to ignore the
consequences of eliminating individuals able to be productive in the positions
they hold, by limiting its coverage to only those who can meet the substantial
limitation threshold.

D. The "RegardedAs" Prongin the Definition ofDisability
Arguably, the criticisms of the ADA raised so far can be resolved or at least
greatly limited by the application ofthe third prong of the disability definition,
which protects individuals who are only "regarded as" having a disability.213
This prong at least potentially protects not-impaired-enough individuals from
arbitrary actions on the part of their employers, because unlike under the first
prong, the degree of actual physical or mental limitation is not relevant here."1 4

note 203, at 222-23 (citing 1992 statistics from the HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS &
MEANS, 102D CONG., GREEN BOOK 65 (1992)). He argues that much of this residual
unemployment cannot be explained except in terms of employer stereotyping about
productivity issues. See Mashaw, supra note 203, at 223. He concludes that the purely
economic losses from excluding these otherwise productive individuals could be
enormous. See Mashaw, supranote 203, at 223.
212. The added irony of Patterson is that the plaintiff was a teacher of children
with mental retardation, whose employer avoided having to even consider whether her
mental impairment could be reasonably accommodated to allow her to continue her work.
Instead, the employer characterized her as not deserving of protection from disability
discrimination, despite having decided she was too impaired to be an effective teacher.
See Patterson, 150 F.3d at 721-23.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
214. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) (1999) (describing coverage of the "regarded as"
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On the surface, this argument looks good. Congress after all added that
prong to extend coverage to persons who did not have an actual disability but
who were affected by negative attitudes toward them based on a perception of
disability." 5 There are several reasons, however, why this prong cannot be
relied upon to fix the problems that including "substantially limits" in the first
prong creates.
The first is that the ADA as written incorporates the substantial limitation
requirement into the perceived disability. The third prong covers individuals
"regarded as having such an impairment."2 6 By its plain language, this means
a disability that substantially limits a major life activity.1 7 In the two 1999
mitigating measure cases, Sutton andMurphy, the Supreme Court confirmed this
reading of the statute when it concluded that the plaintiffs in those cases had
proved only that their employers regarded their impairments to limit their ability
to perform a particular job, and not their general ability to "work" as a major life
activity.21 8 The "regarded as" prong thus incorporates the flawed idea that only
certain impairments, real or perceived, are deserving of anti-discrimination
protection.
Another reason the "regarded as" prong fails as a gap-filler relates to the
anti-stereotyping agenda behind its inclusion in the ADA. As previously
established, the third prong of the statutory definition of disability was added to
specifically address biases and stereotypes about people with disabilities. 2"9 At
the same time, the "regarded as" prong has an open-ended character that could
vastly increase the number of people protected by the ADA over the 43 million
figure contained in the statutory findings and purposes section.220 One way to
limit the size of the potential protected class is to use the presence or absence of
stereotyping as part of the test for deciding which employers should be held
liable.

prong).
215. See H.R. REp. No. 101-485(IH), at 30, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
453-54; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing why the third prong

was originally added to the Rehabilitation Act definition of "handicapped").
216. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (emphasis added).
217. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149-50 (1999)

(interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) to incorporate basic terms of definition of
disability in Section 12102(2)(A) (1994)).
218. Id. (holding that employer disqualified employee from only the job of "global
airline pilot"); Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999) (holding employer

disqualified employee only from mechanics positions that required driving a commercial
vehicle, not mechanics jobs in general).
219. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
220. The language of the findings appears to refer to individuals with actual

disabilities. The findings provide that "some 43 million Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added).
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For example, the Third Circuit recently created what it called "a limited
reasonability defense" that allows an employer to escape liability for mistakenly
regarding an employee as having a disability as long as the mistake is not based
on stereotypes about the plaintiff s impairment, occurs during an individualized
assessment of the employee, and is the result of some errors or omissions by the
" ' The court defended its
employee in providing information to the employer.22
adoption of this defense by reasoning that when there is no evidence that the
decisionmakers were infected with stereotypes or prejudice against the disabled,
the aims of the ADA are best served by letting the employer off the hook as long
as the employer at least initiates individualized assessment of the employee's
actual condition. 2z In other words, stereotypes are the principal evil of the
statute, and where it can be reasonably argued they are not at play because there
was an individualized assessment process at work, the ADA's concerns have
been satisfied.223
By contrast, some courts reject the idea that evidence that the employer
relied on stereotypes is itself sufficient to state a perceived disability claim.224
They point out that the plaintiff must still first show that the disability as

221. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999).
222. Id. at 192-93.
223. The decision in Taylor seems at odds with a prior Third Circuit decision in
which the court reasoned that innocent mistakes as to the severity or existence of an
impairment can support a finding of a perceived disability under the third prong. See
Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Third

Circuit defended the rule it adopted in Taylor as being consistent with Deane's
requirement that the employer take reasonable steps to learn the true extent of the
employee's impairment. See Taylor, 177 F.3d at 194. The Third Circuit in Taylor
apparently reconciled the two cases by viewing the exception it created in Taylor as
limited to cases where the plaintiff is to blame for the confusion. In actuality, the court

added the requirement that the plaintiff prove that he acted reasonably in informing the
employer of the actual extent of his physical or mental condition.
224. See, e.g., Lessard v. Osram Sylvania, 175 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1999). In
Lessard,the plaintiff alleged that his employer fired him because of assumptions about
his inability to work as a spot welder because of a scarred and disfigured hand. Id. at
195. He argued that his former employer was motivated by stereotypes that he was
injury prone and would drive up insurance costs. Id. at 199. The First Circuit rejected
the idea that a perceived disability claim can rest on such "myth-motivated actions,"
concluding that Congress by the language it chose could not have intended that the scope
of protection of perceived disabilities be broader than the scope of protection of actual
disabilities. Id. In other words, regardless of the motivation of the employer, unless it
perceived the plaintiff's limitations to be substantial, which here meant it disqualified
him from general employment, the plaintiff could not establish a covered disability. 1d.
at 198-99; see also Ceretti v. Runyon, No. 97-3109, 1998 WL 403199, at *2 (8th Cir.
July 6, 1998) (rejecting plaintiff's claim because "[w]hile the evidence does show that
the ... hiring supervisors relied upon the medical opinions to conclude that [the plaintiff]
was not medically qualified to perform particularjobs, nothing in the record suggests that
they regarded him as disabled").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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perceived by the employer would have substantially limited a major life
activity.' Under this approach, no matter how evil the stereotype, the plaintiff's
case fails unless the stereotype has sufficient implication regarding the extent of
limitation. Under this approach, the potential number of people covered under
the third prong is as a result limited by elevating "substantially limits" over antistereotyping concerns. 226
As the reasoning of these courts reflects, the anti-stereotyping rationale of
the third prong fails to produce a coherent basis for doctrinal development.
Instead, it allows courts to manipulate coverage of that prong to satisfy their
vision regarding how large the protected class should be.
Finally, relying on the "regarded as" prong as a gap-filler opens up another
set of problems for the plaintiff even if he can get past the definition stage.
There is an emerging split of opinion among the federal courts as to whether a
plaintiff who is only perceived as having a disability is entitled to be reasonably
accommodated. 7 A recent example demonstrating the potential conundrum this
poses for a plaintiff comes out of the Sixth Circuit.
The plaintiff in a Sixth Circuit case, Workman v. Frito-Lay,Inc., s suffered
from irritable bowel syndrome, which at times necessitated leaving her
production line job several times an hour to use the bathroom. 229 The court was
willing to agree that she had an impairment and that controlling one's bowels
230
was a major life activity. 2 0 In contrast to a similar case out of the Second

225. See Lessard, 175 F.3d at 198-99.
226. It is also not unusual for a court to invoke the stereotyping concern of
Congress as an explanation why a particular impairment should not be included in the
category of"disability." For example, one federal court reasoned that "inability to handle
stress" was not an impairment for ADA purposes because the purpose of the ADA was
"'to combat the effects of 'archaic attitudes,' erroneous perceptions and myths that work
to the disadvantage of persons with or regarded as having disabilities"' and not to
"categorize people with common personality traits as disabled." Mundo v. Sanus Health
Plan, 966 F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58
F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted)). This court bolstered its reasoning by
citing the language from Forrisithat the high purpose of the statute would otherwise be
debased. Id. at 173 (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934-35 (4th Cir. 1986));
see also Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Forrisi).
227. Compare Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (reasoning
that Congress probably intended to allow employees perceived to have a disability to be
reasonably accommodated) with Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460,467 (6th Cir.
1999) (reasoning that individual only perceived to have disability is not entitled to
accommodation from employer). See also Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138,
148 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (discussing but not deciding whether perceived

disability plaintiff is entitled to reasonable accommodation and noting EEOC has yet to
take a position on this issue).
228. 165 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1999).
229. Id. at 463.
230. Id. at467.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8

44

2000]

Anderson: Anderson: Deserving Disabilities:
"DESERVING DISABILITIES"

Circuit,"' the Sixth Circuit was also willing to accept the jury's finding that the
plaintiff's condition substantially limited that major life activity.232 This was
significant, because the court stated that if the plaintiff had had to proceed under
the "regarded as" prong, she would not have been entitled to leave the
production line as an accommodation to her condition.233 Instead, her only
recourse would have been to show that the employer generally allowed
employees to be temporarily replaced on this line during a shift, and that by
firing her, the employer therefore treated the plaintiff differently because of her
disability.234
In a case such as that, there are two possible approaches. One is to say what
the Sixth Circuit did, that "regarded as" plaintiffs do not receive reasonable
accommodations. But that leads to an anomalous result in which a plaintiff who
cannot convince a judge that her need for bathroom breaks is a substantial
enough limitation also will not receive the breaks she indisputably needs, unless
everybody else already receives then, in which case she is unlikely to be in court
requesting the accommodation. The other possible approach is to say that
"regarded as" plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable accommodations of the
disability they are perceived to have. But this also leads to anomalous results.
The EEOC's attempt to further define categories of "regarded as" individuals
illustrates these difficulties.
The EEOC defines three categories of individuals who may be "regarded
as" having a disability.2 5 Two of those categories include individuals who have
physical or mental impairments that are not substantial enough to qualify under
the actual disability prong, but who are perceived as such either by the employer
or as a result of the attitudes of others."s The third category includes persons

231. See Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, 135 F.3d 867 (2d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff in
Ryan was a legal secretary who suffered from colitis. Id. at 868. During flare-ups of the

condition, the plaintiff had to immediately be able to use the bathroom. Id. The Second

Circuit upheld a summary judgment in favor of her employer after applying the factor
analysis articulated in the EEOC's regulations defining substantially limited. Id. at 871-

72 (applying 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1999)). The court found the condition did not
have sufficient duration or impact on the plaintiff's major life activities because it was
asymptomatic for long periods and varied in intensity. Id. The Sixth Circuit in Workman
did not expressly apply the factor analysis in upholding a jury verdict in that case.
Workman, 165 F.3d at 467. Under the reasoning of the Second Circuit, Workman

probably would not have had an actual disability because at the time of her dismissal, her
condition had stabilized such that her bathroom use was within the "normal" range
according to her doctor. Id. at 463. She was seeking accommodation "just in case" the
condition in the future required her to leave the line several times an hour. Id. at 464.
232. Workman, 165 F.3d at 467.
233. Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999).
234. Id.
235. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)-(3) (1999).

236. An individual regarded as having a disability can be one who "[h]as a physical
or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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who have no impairment but are treated as if they do. 7 Accommodation is not
generally going to'be an issue with the third category, where there is no actual
physical or mental impairment of any kind that might need to be accommodated.
Clearly, all that needs to be eliminated there is the stereotyped attitude.
As for the first two categories, a similar, plausible argument exists that these
"regarded as" plaintiffs should not be entitled to "reasonable accommodation,"
at least to the extent it means changes in the structure of the position itself. The
"regarded as" prong was intended to address stereotypes, and arguably the
recourse here as well should be removal of the stereotype at issue. In other
words, because they do not have an actual disability, these individuals are at
most entitled to be treated without regard to the impairment. If individuals who
fall under the third prong because of less-than-substantial impairments are
entitled to the same sort of accommodations as individuals who fall under the
first prong because of substantial impairments, then there is no real difference
between the two.
Yet, by defining individuals regarded as having a disability separately from
individuals who have disabilities, Congress created a distinction that must be
held to mean something.2 8 The reasonable accommodation approach to the
"regarded as" prong effectively reads "substantially limits" out of the statute.
Technically, this convolution results only because the basic statutory definition
of disability distinguishes between individuals with impairments.
The EEOC was correct in perceiving that people with impairments that do
not fit the first prong's definition are also subject to arbitrary action based on
those impairments. The solution does not lie, however, in ignoring the current
statutory distinctions. The solution is to place all individuals with impairments
of major life activities into the first prong and all persons without such
impairments into the third prong.239

by a covered entity as constituting such a limitation;" or one who "[h]as a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the
attitudes of others toward such impairment." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1), (2) (1999).
237. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(3) (1999).
238. Cf. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 741-42
(1989) (rejecting proposed tests to interpret the "work for hire" standard under the
Copyright Act of 1976 because it would ignore the structure of the statute and the
distinctions Congress drew regarding ways in which a work can be deemed for hire).
239. The specifics of how this would work are set out in Part IV(B) infra. So far,

I have not addressed the middle prong, which protects individuals who have a "record
of' a disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(B) (1994). That prong raises similar problems
in the employment context as the ones I point out in the text for the "regarded as" prong,
because in theory, the individual relying on the middle prong also does not actually have
an impairment that is substantially limiting. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(k)
(1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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IV. "DISABILITY" DEFINED WITHOUT "SUBSTANTIALLY LIMITS"
How would the ADA operate under a revised definition of disability that
eliminates "substantially limits"? This Part argues that elimination of the
"substantially limits" requirement would result in a superior ADA on several
levels. The ability of courts to use stereotyping as a means to either include or
exclude individuals from the protected class would be substantially controlled.
The convoluted relationship between actual and perceived disability could be
sorted out. The function of the "major life activity" requirement would be
clarified, and its definition could be simplified. Finally, the focus in disability
cases would be placed where it belongs: on issues of qualification and
accommodation.

A. GrantingOnly a Limited License to Make NormativeDistinctions
In the discussion of the mitigating measure cases, the example of insulindependent diabetes was used.24 Under the current ADA, after the 1999 trilogy,
individuals alleging that they have diabetes will be required to establish their
personal level of limitation as someone who takes injections of insulin. Even
under the now-rejected approach urged by the EEOC, the inquiry would have
been what level of impairment is experienced by someone who has this type of
diabetes. Either way, the courts are invited to impose a normative standard
about what degree of deviation from the norm is substantial enough.
Under the revision proposed, the inquiry in such a case is simplified: Is
insulin-dependent diabetes a physical or mental impairment? If so, does it have
an effect on the individual's major life activities? Because there is no
requirement to show "how much" effect, the plaintiff proceeds with her claim
under a much less burdensome standard. More importantly, this approach
recognizes that disability is indeed different in important respects from other
protected characteristics, but only to the extent that disability is often a "hidden"
characteristic. 24' The suggested revision gives courts a limited license to inquire
into the sufficiency of the plaintiffs allegation of protected class status. The
purpose of the inquiry is not to compare the plaintiff to others with disabilities
or to determine some unavoidably arbitrary standard about degree of deviation
from the norm.
This standard is not unlike the evidentiary standard for proof of harm in a
personal injury claim. The disability discrimination plaintiff must show the
existence of a functional limitation as the result of a physical or mental
impairment just as the plaintiff in a tort claim must prove physical or emotional

240. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
241. See Locke, supra note 11, at 114-15 (noting the difficulty in determining
protected class status for individuals with "hidden" impairments that do not have easily
recognizable manifestations).
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harm resulted from the tort.242 Some disability cases may require a medical
expert to establish the existence of the impairment, but many will not.243 In most
cases, the plaintiff should be able to establish the "effects" standard by his or her
own testimony."
This standard might, at first glance, seem inconsistent with this Article's
earlier critique of the way the ADA approaches different disabilities like
blindness and carpal tunnel syndrome.245 The point there was that the law treats
these individuals differently regarding their basic right to claim civil rights
protections based on stereotypes about the impairment itself. Under the revised
definition, the question is more straightforward and of an evidentiary nature, one
that is the same for all impairments. Blindness affects vision and carpal tunnel
affects the ability to perform manual tasks. It might be easier to meet the
evidentiary standard to show effect in the case of blindness, but the person with

242. I recognize there is some danger in raising this analogy, because in a personal
injury case, the jury makes a type of substantiality determination when it assesses a
monetary damages award. There is a preliminary determination the jury must make that
the plaintiff in fact suffered an injury as a result of the tort, and that is the standard to
which I am analogizing. Cf Rhoades v. Boren, 486 F.2d 132, 134 (5th Cir. 1973)
(distinguishing jury's role in determining amount of damages from its role in determining
the existence of damages).
243. In regard to the need for an expert, I depart from the personal injury standard
that generally always requires use of a medical expert. See, e.g., Hensley v. Danek Med.,
Inc., 32 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (W.D.N.C. 1998) (articulating general rule that jury awards
in personal injury cases cannot be sustained in the absence of expert medical testimony
as to causation). Disability cases will not always require medical experts because the
cause of the impairment itself is not at issue, unlike in personal injury cases. In many
disability instances, the existence of the impairment can be readily established by lay
testimony. Also, when an expert is needed, I do not suggest plaintiffs must hire highly
paid trial experts. Cf Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 570 (criticizing ADA rulings on
"working" in particular that require plaintiffs to hire expensive vocational experts).
Rather, a plaintiff in a disability case will often have a personal doctor or counselor who
has been working with the individual on issues relating to the physical or mental
impairment. It may not even be necessary for the plaintiff to present a formal diagnosis

of a medical condition. See Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805 (7th Cir. 1998).
InLeisen, the plaintiff claimed a "mental impairment like depression." Id. at 808. The
Seventh Circuit concluded she created a jury question on the issue by presenting
evidence from her counselor that she suffered sleep and memory problems, anxiety,
suicidal ideation, and "some depression." Id. If the disability inquiry is viewed from a
revised evidentiary perspective, the standard becomes less rigid.
244. It is already the case that plaintiffs seek to establish the substantially limiting
effects of an impairment by their own testimony. For example, in Bragdon v. Abbott,
the Supreme Court concluded the plaintiff established that her major life activity of
reproduction was substantially limited when she testified that her HIV infection
controlled her decision not to have a child. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 640-41
(1998).
245. See supra notes 185-96 and accompanying text.
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carpal tunnel has the same right to participate in the protected class as the person
who is blind.
This Article does not suggest that all consideration of a "nonn" must be
eliminated. The need for some norm is inescapable. Otherwise, the protected
class would have no defining characteristics. The proposed revision retains the
definition of impairment found in the regulations and interpretive guidance.246
Specifically, physical traits like eye color, hair color, and height and weight
within "normal" ranges; cultural and economic characteristics like lack of
education and poverty; and characteristics like age and pregnancy that are not
considered disorders, all mentioned in the current regulations,247 would still not
be considered impairments. Disorders and medical conditions that might be
associated with those characteristics would be considered impairments.24 The
distinctions drawn here are largely defined by medical science which, though not
perfect, may be the most objective source available.2 49
Courts are accustomed to assessing medical evidence from their experience
in handling personal injury claims. This is not to say that personal injury
litigation avoids normative decisionmaking. 2 0 By recasting the inquiry into
disability status as more akin to the evaluation of the sufficiency of evidence of
injury in tort cases, however, the revised ADA would remove emphasis from the
deserving status of the plaintiff and place it on more universal evidentiary

246. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h)
(1999).
247. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
248. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (1999).
249. I recognize that some disability advocates find reliance on a medical approach
to determining disability objectionable. See Burgdorf, supra note 7, at 443 (quoting
TOWARD INDEPENDENCE, supranote 140, at A-22 to A-23 ). The basis for this objection
appears to be the fact that such an approach invokes the medical model of disability,
which in turn invokes the idea that disability is some deviation-from an arbitrary
physiological standard that must be fixed or cured. Cf Drimmer, supra note 29, at 134748 (criticizing the underlying concepts of the medical model). I do not believe, however,
that looking to medical diagnosis as the means to determine impairment leads to adopting
the medical model of disability. The medical model denies that the reality of disability
lies as much in attitude and societal-imposed stigma as in physiology. See Drimmer,
supra note 29, at 1347-48. Although a revised ADA necessarily would place emphasis
on physiological standards to determine impairment, it would deemphasize the need to
litigate the extent of limitations in order to obtain protected class status. At the same
time, it would recognize the practical reality that there needs to be some means to identify
the characteristic that the statute protects under the first prong of the definition of
"disability."
250. For a discussion of the intersection between tort law and the law relating to
disability, which raises issues about the normative application of tort law, see Adam A.
Milani, Living in the World: A New Look at the Disabledin the Law of Torts, 48 CATH.
U. L. REV. 323 (1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

49

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 8

MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 65

concerns. The result should be less confusing and more predictable than the
current state of affairs.
Employers currently have to evaluate not just whether the employee has a
covered impairment, but also whether the employee is impaired enough to be
afforded ADA protection. 251 To make this preliminary decision under the
revised ADA, employers would be able to rely more directly on the evidence of
impairment and its effects presented by the employee either personally or
through the employee's healthcare providers, rather than requiring up front a
detailed determination of what the employee can and cannot do.252 Employees
should similarly find it less difficult to know
whether they have the right to rely
253
on the protections offered by the ADA.
B. The Convolution ofthe Firstand ThirdProngs of the Definition of
DisabilityIs Resolved Under the Revised ADA
Revising the first prong of the definition of disability to ask only if the
plaintiff has an impairment that affects major life activities would clarify the
coverage ofthe "regarded as" prong as well. The elusive search for evidence of
how impaired the employer perceived the individual to be could be eliminated.
If the employer takes adverse employment action such as refusing to hire, firing,
or demoting an individual because of a perception of some physical or mental
impairment that does not actually exist, the employer's acts would be unlawful
under the ADA. No other inquiry as to the extent of the impairment would need
be conducted.
The revision would also settle the question of whether an individual only
perceived to have a disability is entitled to reasonable accommodation. The
revised ADA would recognize that "regarded as" disability discrimination is
most akin to other forms of discrimination because the condition of the person
has no real connection to the ability to do the job . ' For that reason, the recourse
of the individual affected can be limited to injunctive relief and reinstatement or

251. One reference source for employers suggests that employers should not "get
caught up in" making decisions about whether an employee is disabled because it is a
legal conclusion and requires medical certification of what the employee can and cannot

do. See Arthur D. Rutkowski & Barbara Lang Rutkowski, You Have to State Which
MajorLife Activity is Affected to Be Coveredby the ADA,

EMPLOYMENT

L. UPDATE, May

1999, at 7.
252. Employers who have worked with workers compensation programs will
probably find this pr6cess quite familiar.
253. The likely effect on employee litigation choices is addressed in Part IV(C)
infra.
254. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and

ReasonableAccommodation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1,8 (1996) (describing victim of "perceived"
disability discrimination as victim of "traditional discrimination" for whom reasonable
accommodation is irrelevant).
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damages in the same fashion as it is in a race or sex discrimination case."' No
accommodation is necessary because no function of the individual is impaired.
On the other hand, in cases involving actual disabilities, the person's
condition does have a connection to his or her ability to perform a job. This
prong of the definition should retain its role as the means to eliminate arbitrary
physical and institutional barriers to full participation unique to disability. But
those barriers exist only if the individual has an impairment that has an effect on
his or her functioning. The ADA would truly be vulnerable to the
characterization of creating "special rights" rather than equal rights if a wholly
open-ended right to claim discrimination through failure to accommodate was
created.
An example is useful to illustrate these points. In Rodriguez v. Loctite P.R.,
Inc., a case arising out of the Federal District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico, the plaintiff was diagnosed with systemic lupus erthematosus, commonly
known as lupus.257 She alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work
environment based on her disability and that this resulted in her constructive
discharge."' There was no dispute that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with
lupus or that the employer knew this.25 9 The plaintiff lost her perceived
disability claim, however, because the court concluded the employer did not
perceive her as substantially limited in a major life activity.260 To the contrary,
the employer appeared to view her as a malingerer.261 She also lost her actual
disability claim because the court found the history of sporadic symptoms she
alleged did not add up to a substantial limitation of any major life activities.262
Under the revised definition of disability, the plaintiff would not have been
required to prove that her employer perceived her as having a substantial
limitation of major life activities. She would only have been required to prove

255. Title VII damages for race and sex discrimination are limited to either
injunctive and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994), or, in cases of
intentional discrimination, compensatory and punitive damages under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly
provides that the same damages apply in cases brought under Title I of the ADA. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (1994).
256. 967 F. Supp. 653 (D.P.R. 1997).
257. Rodriguez, 967 F. Supp. at 653.
258. Id. at 656.
259. See id. at 657, 658.
260. Id. at 658.
261. See id.
262. Rodriguez v. Loctite P.R., Inc., 967 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D.P.R. 1997). The

plaintiff actually failed to identify any major life activities limited by her condition,
instead arguing that "it [was] reasonable to infer [that her symptoms were] impairments
which limit one or more major life activities." Id. at 658. The court rejected this
argument out of hand, indicating the argument went counter to the mission of the ADA
to eliminate stereotypes associated with disabilities. Id.
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that the employer took actions against her because she was diagnosed with lupus.
In the context of what was essentially a disability harassment claim,263 she would
have been required to prove the same elements as in a similar claim under Title
VII-a workplace "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs employment and
create an abusive working environment." 26 The employer in such a case is

using the characteristic possessed by the employee, here the diagnosis of lupus,
as a means to harass and limit equal participation in the workplace. The extent
to which the employer views the plaintiff as affected by lupus is irrelevant, just
as the extent to which an employer views someone as being feminine or black
is irrelevant in Title VII cases.
Should the plaintiff seek to assert a right to be accommodated in her
employment because she suffers from lupus, the inquiry necessarily must
change. Now, the extent of the plaintiffs limitations and how they impede her
ability to perform the job in question must be considered. If accommodation is
required here, it is not simply because it is "reasonable" in terms of cost and
effect. Rather, accommodation is made because the individual holds the status
of a member of a group that has been denied equal participation in the labor
market. That denial is the result of improper consideration of functional
limitations.
Accommodation in this sense is the removal of improper consideration of
the plaintiffs functional limitations, "consideration" of which is manifested
through the adoption of certain job duties or expectations or through the physical
structuring of the workplace. "Special" rights are not involved because arbitrary
reliance on functional limitation creates unequal opportunity to participate in the
labor market with others who do not have that functional limitation.
Theoretically, if the plaintiff has no actual functional limitation, provision of
accommodation cannot be said to fill that same role. The employer in that case
is not required to treat that person "differently" in order to provide equal job
opportunities."'

263. Whether there is a claim for hostile environment disability discrimination is,
at present, an open question. The court in Rodriguez assumed such a claim existed
because of the similarity between the ADA and Title VII, which both prohibit
discrimination in the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Rodriguez, 967
F. Supp. at 662; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
Resolution of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
264. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
265. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 10-11 (articulating reasonable

accommodation doctrine as resting on a "difference" model of discrimination).
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C. The Revised Definition of DisabilityClarifies the Role of
"MajorLife Activities "

Following the line of thought that reasonable accommodations are not
required when the individual has no actual limitation of physical or mental
function raises the question of whether the revised ADA should simply identify
impairment as a requisite for protected status and then move on to consideration
of whether accommodations must be provided. In other words, should plaintiffs
still be required to identify major life activities limited by a physical or mental
impairment under a revised ADA?
One recent article suggests that the standard should be "impairmentonly." 66 This approach attempts to avoid having courts make any sort of value
judgment about the plaintiffs status by shifting the entire inquiry to the
accommodation stage, which presumably would be more difficult for courts to
dismiss on summary judgment.267 This arguably would not have a significant
effect on the duty to reasonably accommodate because accommodations are only
required when an impairment limits a person's opportunities to perform ajob or
to participate on an equal basis in the benefits and privileges of the job.268 If no
impairment exists or if no barrier to performance is posed, then no
accommodation is required.269
While the definition of disability should be revised because it currently
allows rampant application of normative standards to judge between individuals
with disabilities, shifting the entire inquiry to the reasonable accommodation
issue is not the best option. The inquiry into effect on "major life activities"
serves an important purpose in requiring a connection between the existence of
an impairment and the functional limitation for which the plaintiff seeks
accommodation.
The criticism of including "major life activities" in the definition of
disability is based on its reliance, like that of "substantially limits," on some
assumed norm."
Just what is a "major" life activity? Resolution of that

266. Eichhom, supranote 14, at 1475-76.
267. Eichhom criticizes the definition of major life activity as failing to set out a
consistent scheme of analysis and thereby allowing courts to draw distinctions out of
distrust of the impairments alleged by plaintiffs. See Eichhom, supra note 14, at 144344, 1449. She does not specifically address whether adopting her standard will result in
fewer summary judgments because courts view the reasonable accommodation issue as
not amenable to determination as a matter of law. The case law nonetheless seems to
suggest that courts are more cognizant of the need for jury determination of both that
issue and whether an individual is "otherwise qualified." See Colker, supra note 11, at
112-15 (summarizing holdings of circuit courts that accommodations and qualifications
issues are issues of fact that should not be decided on summary judgment).
268. See Eichhom, supra note 14, at 1476-77.
269. See Eichhom, supra note 14, at 1476-77.
270. See Eichhom, supra note 14, at 1428 (reasoning that the categorization of
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question requires a subjective evaluation of the comparative significance of the
" ' Unlike the norm that accompanies
life activities alleged.27
"substantially
limits," however, this norm cannot be escaped.272 At some point, the extent of
the plaintiff's functional limitations has to be assessed, even under the
impairment-only approach. The participants have to know what must be
accommodated. A value judgment about that limitation ultimately is still made
in the impairment-only approach, but it ends up being part of an open-ended
evaluation of reasonableness.
Retaining an intermediary step of assessing functional limitation can serve
as an effective means of avoiding an over-inclusive rule by supplying a needed
causal element. It would keep plaintiffs from creating jury questions on
accommodation by relying simply on the coincidence of some work-related issue
and the presence of an impairment.
For example, in a case out of the Fifth Circuit, Hamilton v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co.,273 the plaintiff claimed that he suffered from post traumatic

stress disorder, which accounted for his actions in verbally abusing and striking
a co-worker on the job.274 He sought to be accommodated by transfer off of a
project in which his department was participating because he claimed the project
was exacerbating his stress. 275 His employer instead fired him for refusing to
participate in the project. 276 The Fifth Circuit dismissed the case by finding the
plaintiff had not established sufficient evidence of substantial limitation of a
major life activity.277
Had the standard for determining disability status been "impairment-only,"
the plaintiff in a case like the one described above may well have been able to
get his case past the protected class issue and to the accommodation issue
without having to show that his abusive behavior was a result of his impairment.

some activities as "major" incorporates the historic arbitrariness inherent in the label
"disability" which itself depends on arbitrary notions about what activities people should
be able to perform and how).
271. See Eichhom, supranote 14, at 1440. The comparative significance standard
comes from Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). Applying a "comparative
importance" or "significance" standard, the Court concluded that reproduction was a
major life activity because it was "central to the life process itself." Id. at 638.
272. The EEOC's technical assistance on reasonable accommodation presently
incorporates a comparison to the norm in evaluating how much accommodation must be
provided: "An equal employment opportunity means an opportunity to attain the same
level of performance or to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are
available to an averagesimilarly-situatedemployee without a disability." EEOC, ADA
TITLE I TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL 1-3.3 (1992) (emphasis added).
273. 136 F.3d 1047 (5th Cir. 1998).
274. See Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1049.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1051.
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Disability discrimination law is not intended, however, to allow employees to
structure jobs to suit their personal preferences. 27' Retaining an intermediate
determination of the plaintiff's functional limitation serves both to avoid creating
jury questions in mere preference cases and to limit the ability of the employer
to divert the jury's attention from the established limitation when arguing the
reasonableness of the requested accommodation.
Of course, this so far ignores the underlying argument behind the
impairment-only approach that determinations of major life activities contain
normative distinctions similar to those criticized earlier in this Article.
Designation of an activity as "major" creates a hierarchy among activities that
is itself socially constructed. One illustration offered in support of this view is
hearing.27 9 Hearing is not a major life activity to one born deaf; hearing is a
major life activity because society has deemed it so. 280 Just as with
"substantially limits," the standards here invite courts to use them as devices to
weed out claims by claimants they deem unworthy.281
After "substantially limits" is eliminated, however, "major life activities"
should be understood as the means to identify functional limitation caused by the
physical or mental impairment for purposes of moving on to the reasonable
accommodation analysis, nothing more.282 Much of the current difficulty with
"major life activity" can be explained by the fact that courts are not altogether

capable of separating the concept of major life activity from the concept of
substantiality in the definition of disability.

An opinion out of the Second Circuit forcefully reflects this tendency. In
evaluating the major life activity alleged by the plaintiff (everyday mobility), the
court expressed the following concern:
[W]hile it might be hard to show that a very mild cough substantially
limits the major life activity of "breathing," it would be far easier to
make an individualized showing of a substantial limitation if the major
life activity were instead defined more narrowly as, say, the major life
activity of "breathing atop Mount Everest." . . . Narrowing and

diluting the definition of a major life activity, which in turn might

278. Cf Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 569-70 (noting that ADA was intended to
provide evenhanded treatment and not preferences to individuals with disabilities).

279. See Eichhom, supra note 14, at 1411.
280. See Eichhom, supranote'14, at 1411.
281. Eichhom also uses procreative versus non-procreative sex as an example of
a distinction appellate courts will likely be called upon to make after Bragdon v. Abbott.
See Eichhom, supra note 14, at 1441-42. This example also clearly invokes socially
constructed distinctions between types of sexual activity that draw on ideas of
significance or worthiness.
282. The requirement of showing functional limitation in any event only applies
to cases brought under the first prong. Perceived disability cases do not depend on any
actual limitations, so the issue of major life activities is irrelevant there.
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lessen the plaintiff's burden of proving a substantial limitation, would
undermine the role of the statute's "substantially limit[ation]" inquiry

in ensuring that only impairments of some significance are protected
2 83
by the ADA.
Similarly, in cases alleging limitations in the ability to lift, courts tend to link
"major life activity" and "substantially limits" and bypass the issue of whether
lifting itself is a major life activity' by viewing such cases as raising only the
question of whether a plaintiff who cannot lift objects over a certain weight has
28
a disability.

When "substantially limits" is removed from the definition, that linkage is
broken. In the case of lifting, it becomes irrelevant how many pounds an
individual can or cannot lift when determining that person's protected class
status. 286 The only question is whether "lifting" is a function of comparative

importance in human activity, a question that should be relatively easily
answered in the affirmative.8 7
As the Second Circuit excerpt set out above suggests, because of the
difficulty in establishing substantial limitations of the major life activities
identified in the regulations, plaintiffs have been forced to attempt to carve out
some level of functioning at which their impairments can be perceived as

283. Reeves v. Johnson Controls Worldwide Serv., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir.
1998) (alteration in original). The plaintiff in Reeves experienced panic attacks
associated with agoraphobia. Id.
284. The ADA regulations do not specifically list lifting as a major life activity but
the interpretive guidance to those regulations does. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)
(1999) (defining major life activities to include functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working) with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (1999) (describing the list

as non-exhaustive and asserting that other activities such as sitting, standing, lifting, and
reaching are included). In Bragdon, the Supreme Court accepted the characterization of
the list as non-exhaustive and agreed that reproduction was another function properly
included in the list. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
285. See, e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th
Cir. 1996) (finding as a matter of law that a twenty-five pound lifting limitation does not
constitute a significant restriction on lifting or any other major life activity); Aucutt v.
Six Flags over Mid-America, 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting significance
of twenty-five pound lifting restriction as proof of disability).
286. Consideration of the amount a person can lift would then become part of the
"qualified" and "reasonable accommodation" analysis. For instance, the interpretive
guidance to Title I specifically describes a reasonable accommodation process for an
employee with a lifting impairment who holds a position requiring lifting fifty pound
sacks and carrying them from a loading dock to a storage room. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630,
app. § 1630.9 (1999).
287. See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120

S. Ct. 45 (1999).
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substantially limiting. For example, in a Tenth Circuit case, Pack v. K-Mart
Corp.,288 a plaintiff diagnosed with depression alleged that she was substantially
limited in her ability to both sleep and concentrate. 8 9 She apparently alleged
impairment to her ability to concentrate because her sleep deprivation was only
"periodic. 290 Indeed, the district court dismissed both claims, finding neither
periodic sleep deprivation nor concentration major life activities. 29' The Tenth
Circuit decided that sleeping was a major life activity, but agreed that
concentration was not.292 The court then proceeded to confirm the dismissal of
the claim because the plaintiff had not293
shown that her sleep disruption had
anything other than a temporary impact.
The plaintiff in Pack likely alleged concentration as a major life activity in
that case because she expected the sleeping claim to fail. Under the revised
ADA, this would have been unnecessary. In addition, major life activities
already identified in the regulations, such as caring for oneself and performing
manual tasks, are broad enough to cover the effects of impairments like
depression, if the plaintiff does not need to deal with a normative "substantially
limits" standard. 294 Accordingly, plaintiffs will generally be less vulnerable
under the new standard to having their claims dismissed for failure to adequately
identify a major life activity. 295

288. Pack, 166 F.3d at 1300.
289. Id. at 1303.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1305.
293. Id. at 1306.
294. Bragdon is another example where the choice of major life activity alleged
was probably influenced by the difficulty of proving substantial limitation. The Court
remarked about the fact that the plaintiff in that case chose to assert reproduction as the
major life activity affected, when the disease had been described by the plaintiff and
various amici as having a "profound impact on almost every phase of the infected
person's life." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (1999). The plaintiff probably did
so because of the difficulty of proving actual impact on other activities already included
in the regulatory definition, such as caring for oneself. See also Deas v. River West,
L.P., 152 F.3d 471,479 n.18 (5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing claim of plaintiff who argued
"awareness" should be considered a major life activity substantially limited by her
seizure disorder associated with epilepsy), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2411 (1999).
295. Cf Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 168 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.
1999). The Tenth Circuit reversed a jury award for the plaintiff in Poindexterbecause
the plaintiff had not sufficiently identified what major life activity was affected by a
physical or mental impairment. Id. at 1231-32. The plaintiff alleged that she suffered
from panic attacks, which affected her ability to commute from her home in Kansas City
to Topeka, where her office had been relocated after she started work. Id. at 1229-30.
According to the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff had to articulate with precision what
impairment she alleged and what major life activity was affected by that impairment. Id.
at 1232 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1999)). The court's review of the
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D. "Working" Should Be Eliminatedas a SeparateMajorLife Activity
The revised ADA also would permit the elimination of one major life
activity which has proved quite troublesome: "working." As originally
envisioned, this category was based on a sense that, for some people, an
impairment may not be severe enough to prevent them from performing basic
life tasks but may prevent them from performing the higher functioning tasks
associated with working.296 The EEOC interpretive guidance directed courts to
consider this major life activity only in cases in which sufficient limitation of any
other major life activity cannot be found.297 Despite this, working seems to be
the most common major life activity alleged to be affected,298 and there are
examples of cases in which courts have imported an "affects employability"
standard even into cases alleging some other major life activity.299
The inclusion of "working" with other major life activities was problematic
from the start. It is different in character from the other types of major life
activities described in the statute. The other activities include such things as
record indicated the case went to the jury without identifying any particular impairment
of major life activities. Id.
If the plaintiff is proceeding under the current version of the ADA, the reluctance
to specify a major life activity is understandable. The burden of proving substantial
limitation of aparticularactivity is daunting. Under the revised ADA, it would not be
onerous to require a plaintiff to identify precisely which major life activity or activities
are alleged to be affected. Cases in which a plaintiff, even under a minimized burden,
cannot explain what affect an impairment has should not be able to proceed to evaluation
of accommodations.
296. Locke, supra note 11, at 115.
297. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1999). Some view this guidance as
recognizing that limitation in the ability to work is harder to conceive, and that plaintiffs
should not have to overcome the heavier burdens associated with it when other major life
activities are affected. See Locke, supra note 11, at 115-16.
298. This has been especially true in cases involving diseases like diabetes and
cancer. See, e.g., Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1997)
(plaintiff with insulin-dependent diabetes asserted only impairment of life activity of
working); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff
with breast cancer raised issue only of limitation on major life activity of working).
These cases probably proceeded under working only because of the higher standard
required to prove actual limitation of other basic life functions under "major life activity."
299. See, e.g., Castro v. Local 1199, 964 F. Supp. 719, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(reasoning that for plaintiff's asthma to qualify as substantially limiting her ability to
breathe, she had to show it has an overall effect of restricting her employment
opportunities generally). Plaintiffs themselves might be to blame for the confusion, as
some cases suggest that they have not adequately separated arguments about other major
life activities from arguments about their limitations on working. See, e.g., Hilbum v.
Murata Elec. N. Am., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1381-82 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd 181 F.3d
1220 (lth Cir. 1999) (plaintiff who initially alleged 10 pound lifting restriction
apparently framed her case as establishing disqualification from a class ofjobs).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/8
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walking, seeing, breathing, and learning, which are described as "basic
functions."" There is universal understanding of the definition of these
functions, 30 1 and they can therefore be treated categorically. Working, on the
other hand, consists of a constellation of other functions. Rather than breaking
down each of those functions, the regulations define working in terms of
securing employment.30 2 The regulations set out a detailed list of factors for
determining when a person is substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, which focuses on how many jobs from which the person has been
within the geographical area to which the person has reasonable
disqualified
303
access.
The problem with this, however, is that the concept of working as a major
life activity does not work well in theory or in application. The Supreme Court
has criticized it as invoking circular reasoning: disability is established by
proving exclusion from work, but the basic question is whether disability
resulted in exclusion from work.3 4 Perhaps because of this, courts have been
particularly hostile to cases alleging limitations of the major life activity of
working, especially those cases proceeding under the "regarded as" prong. 30 5 By
adopting a narrow interpretation of substantially limits in the context of working,
illustrated by the exclusion-from-one-job rule discussed above,3° courts can
avoid reaching the actual merits of these cases.30 7 In fact, courts often substitute
analysis of disability for what should be analysis of qualification, allowing
employers off the hook without ever having to justify the criteria used to exclude
the individual from the job.
Lifting restrictions again provide a useful example. 03 In one Eighth Circuit
case, the plaintiff was fired from a position as a computer repair technician
because of a permanent lifting restriction imposed by his doctor after a work
accident led him to develop carpal and cubital tunnel syndromes in both
wrists. 30 9 The plaintiff brought suit under the ADA alleging substantial

300. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (1999).
301. Locke, supra note 11, at 115-16.
302. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3) (1999); see also Locke, supra note 11, at 116.
303. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i), (ii) (1999).
304. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2151 (1999) (citation
omitted).
305. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 459. Burgdorf suggests that federal district
courts have in particular been influenced by Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Forrisiv.
Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986), about the need to protect the "high purpose" of the
statute, as discussed in Part H(C) of this Article.
306. See supra notes 114, 116 and accompanying text.
307. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 459.
308. The case involving the teacher with paranoid schizophrenia discussed in Part
Ill(B) of this Article is also an example ofthis tendency. See Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 725-26 (7th Cir. 1998).
309. Gutridge v.Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
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limitation in the life activity of working.3"' The Eighth Circuit dismissed the
claim, finding that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence' of
exclusion from the position of computer repair technician.3" ' The court's
rationale was that the plaintiff was "still able ... to function as a computer
technician for other employers who either do not require lifting as part of their
job duties or can provide assistance." 312 In fact, the plaintiff had found another
computer technician position with an employer who did not impose the same
lifting requirements.3 13
The proper inquiry in that case should have been on whether that
employer's lifting requirements were essential or arbitrary.3 14 There was no
question that the employer fired the employee because he was unable to perform
tasks it deemed "necessary" to his job.1 5 However, because the court was able

to invoke the narrow interpretation of substantially limited inthe life activity of
working, the employer was never required to prove that lifting was in fact a
necessary qualification for the job, and the plaintiff was never given the
opportunity to prove he could indeed perform whatever lifting was necessary.
Instead, the case was framed as appropriate for summary dismissal because of
the plaintiff's failure to create ajury question on the factual issue of disability.316
If the definition of disability no longer turns on substantial limitation, then
reason for the inclusion of working as a major life activity disappears. A
residual category is no longer needed because plaintiffs like the computer
technician should be able to make their cases based on impairment of the other
17
basic types of functions contemplated by the definition of major life activity.
In turn, because those cases will now look only to the existence of some effect
on the individual, courts will not be able to invoke the idea that as long as other

1758 (1999).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 901.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining a qualified individual with a
disability as one who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation).
315. Gutridge v. Clure, 153 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1758 (1999). The employer sent Gutridge a letter of termination that explicitly stated that
his "condition unfortunately prevent[ed him] from being able to fully accomplish the
tasks necessary to perform your job functions." Id.
316. See Colker, supra note 11, at 125. Professor Colker's empirical study of the
outcomes of ADA cases suggests that courts have been too willing to take cases away
from juries and render verdicts in favor of defendants through use of the summary
judgment device.
317. Individuals with carpal tunnel should be able to show effect on "performing
manual tasks." See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i) (1999) (defining major life activities to include
the function of performing manual tasks).
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people will hire the individual in that type of position, whatever reliance the
employer may have placed on the individual's impairment is irrelevant.
E. Redefining Disability Will Result in More PrincipledEvaluations of
"Qualified" and "ReasonableAccommodation"
Clearly, revising the definition of disability to eliminate "substantially
limited" would shift much of the inquiry in a discrimination case. An
individual's qualifications and an employer's reasonable accommodations would
be considered in a greater number of cases. This would be beneficial because
shifting the focus may better foster a body of precedent that employers and
employees alike could use to guide their expectations. The result will be a more
predictable statute that does a better job of eliminating decisions based on
stereotypes and prejudices.
After looking at the "working" cases in particular, it is difficult to escape
the conclusion that one reason courts have been so restrictive in defining
"disability" is their fear of (or distaste for) the reasonable accommodation
requirements of the Act. As discussed in Part I(C),318 courts are reluctant to
make what they perceive to be business judgments. If called upon to decide
whether an employer must accommodate an employee and how, courts feel they
are doing just that, especially if there is no evidence of discriminatory animus on
the part of the employer.1 9 Judicial reluctance here is not unlike that found in
sexual harassment cases, in which courts repeatedly express concerns about not
imposing codes of workplace standards on employers. 20
As also discussed above,32' judicial reluctance additionally stems from a
view that reasonable accommodation creates "special" rights. This is especially
true for accommodations such as job restructuring and job reassignment,322

318. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 59 (1999) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that employer should not have
fired him after verbal dispute relating to his request for TDD telecommunications device
and expressing view that courts should not sit in judgment of employers' management
decisions absent evidence of discriminatory intent); Ward v. Massachusetts Health
Research Inst., Inc., 48 F. Supp. 2d 72, 78 (D. Mass. 1999) (suggesting plaintiff's request
to modify work schedule did not provide sufficient reason to override deference that
should be given employer's judgment regarding what hours employees should work).
320. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80
(1998) (justifying decision to allow same-sex sexual harassment claims as not expanding
Title VII into a general civility code); Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258,
263 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Oncale for proposition that Supreme Court emphasized that
Title VII is not a general civility code for the workplace).
321. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
322. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)03) (1994) (defining reasonable accommodation to
include job restructuring and reassignment to a vacant position).
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which appear to be a form of affirmative action. 32 Even the basic concept of
reasonable accommodation, which calls for an individualized process of fitting
individuals to jobs, suggests personalized special treatment or affirmative
action. 324 The tendency of courts to impose restrictive, normative standards on
the issue of "disability" can thus be viewed as part of the backlash that has been
growing in this country against affirmative action in general.325
When courts choose to dismiss cases at the threshold level of "disability,"
they subvert critical evaluation of actual employer practices. The real issue of
disability discrimination is never reached. In 1983, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights identified the essential reason why reasonable
accommodation is needed: "Discrimination against handicapped people cannot
be eliminated if programs, activities, and tasks are always structured in the ways
people with 'normal' physical and mental abilities customarily undertake
them. 326 Yet, this is exactly what results if courts engage in aggressive gatekeeping regarding "disability."
The irony is that if more cases reached issues of qualification and
reasonable accommodations, the ADA might be more easily applied. The scope
of employers' duty of reasonable accommodation under the ADA has been
described as "the great unsettled question. 327 Besides the basic regulations
prohibiting the failure to make accommodations,328 there is an extensive set of
interpretive guidance on how to determine when accommodation is necessary
and what accommodation is required. 329 This is a reflection of Congress's
purposeful adoption of a standard that must be sorted out on a case-by-case
basis.330

323. See RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW INTHE AGE OF HYPERCAPITALISM: THE
WORKER, THE FAMILY, AND THE STATE 65 (1998) (arguing that reasonable

accommodation does constitute affirmative action when it includes job restructuring and
job reassignment). Professor Colker also articulates the rebuttal to the affirmative action

characterization. Reasonable accommodation requires removal of barriers that denies
individuals with disabilities equal opportunity to participate in the workplace. Id. at 71-

72. It is not like affirmative action in the race and gender sense, which is thought to
provide a "plus" so that an individual might be hired over another, more qualified

individual. Id. at 72.
324. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 14, 21.

325. See COLKER, supra note 323, at 65.
326. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 102 (1983).
327. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 8.

328. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.4, 1630.9 (1999).
329. See 29 C.F.R. app. §§ 1630.2(o), 1630.9, 1630.15(d) (1999); see also EEOC,
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP

UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, EEOC NOTICE

915.002 (1999).

330. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1I), at 62, reprintedat 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 344
(explaining the definition of reasonable accommodation is not exhaustive and was
intended to be determined on the particular facts of the individual case).
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A case-by-case approach does not mean, however, an ad hoe approach.
Professors Pamela Karlan and George Rutherglen have suggested that precedent

developed on reasonable accommodation cases can avoid such problems:
While it is certainly possible that this case-by-case approach to
enforcement could deteriorate into purely ad hoe judicial
decisionmaking, precedent counteracts this tendency, both at the level
of formal legal doctrine and by providing the parties with templates of
reasonable accommodation for settlement and compromise.
Accommodations imposed, or approved, in prior cases simplify the
process of later negotiations over accommodations for other employers
and employees. With the accumulation of decisions, the adequacy of
any particular accommodation will become both better known to the
parties and more easily evaluated by a court.33 '

Reasonable accommodation law seen this way creates a bargaining range.332
Both employers and employees have incentives to favor negotiated rather than
fully litigated accommodations, which means the minimum accommodations
employees are likely to accept will be less than the maximum required by law.333
Consistent with this thesis, studies show the cost of most accommodations has
been considerably lower than critics of the ADA predicted.334 Moreover, the

331. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 21.
332. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 30.
333. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 30. Among the disincentives to

individuals with disabilities to insist on the maximum accommodations identified by
Karlan and Rutherglen are that their search costs and dislocation expenses are likely to

be higher than those incurred by individuals without disabilities because their ability to
locate other employment may be compromised by their disability, and that they may face

retaliation by their employers, which undermines the potential for effect implementation
of accommodations in their workplace. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supranote 254, at 20.

Karlan and Rutherglen suggest that when the uncertainty of outcome that is inherent in
any litigation is added to the picture, the result is that individuals with disabilities may
be biased in the first place toward locating jobs that they can perform with minimal
accommodations. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 20. Looking beyond the
hiring context, Karlan and Rutherglen's analysis also suggests that employees who

develop disabilities while already holding a position will be more likely to make minimal
accommodation demands on employers out of concern about losing that position. See
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 20.

334. See Blanck & Marti, supranote 203, at 377-78. Blanck and Marti report
studies of Sears, Roebuck & Co. that show most accommodations at that company have
required little or no cost. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 203, at 377-78. In addition,
they report studies by the Job Accommodation Network ("JAN") that show that twothirds of accommodations implemented after consultation with that organization have
cost $500 or less. Blanck & Marti, supra note 203, at 378; see also O'Day, supra note

31, at 299 (reporting similar JAN findings).
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data indicate that companies that effectively implement the law experience
substantial economic benefits in terms of increased work productivity,
effectiveness, and efficiency, not only for individuals with disabilities but also
for individuals without disabilities.335 In other words, the fears about the cost of
broad-based duty to accommodate are not supported by the empirical data.336
If courts are gatekeeping out of a fear of cost, then they are engaging in the
same stereotypical thinking about the burdens disability imposes on society that
the ADA was enacted to address. Broadening the definition of disability does
not mean that more suits would be filed. The data suggests it can have the
opposite effect of encouraging more parties to settle disputes, resulting in a more
productive workforce.
As an illustration of these points, consider again the Pack case discussed
above.337 In that case, the plaintiff was a pharmacist who was diagnosed with
major depression, moderate to severe.33 The primary effects of her depression
were difficulty concentrating and periodic sleep disturbances.339 She began
making technical errors in filling prescriptions.34 Her problems in that regard
continued even after two medical leaves.34 She was eventually'discharged by
e lawsuit
a
her employer because of those errors. 342 IIn her
against her employer, she
alleged that it failed to accommodate her depression by transferring her to
another position or providing some other reasonable accommodation.343
As noted above, the Tenth Circuit decision turned on whether she had
sufficiently alleged "disability." The court held she had not. It concluded that
concentration was not a major life activity, that sleep was a major life activity
but that periodic sleep disturbances did not substantially limit that life activity.
Under a revised definition of disability, the plaintiff would have met her,
threshold burden of proving disability with her evidence that the depression
affected her ability to sleep. The fact it was only a periodic effect would not be
taken into consideration at that stage in the analysis.
The periodic nature of the impairment would be taken into account,
however, at the next level of inquiry. This asks whether the plaintiff is a
qualified individual who can perform the job with or without reasonable
accommodation." Certainly, a qualification for being a pharmacist is the ability

335. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 203, at 377-79.
336. See Blanok & Marti, supra note 203, at 375.
337. See Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.

45 (1999); see also supra notes 286-94 and accompanying text.
338. Pack, 166 F.3d at 1302.
339. Id. at 1303.
340. Id. at 1302.
341. Id. at 1302-03.
342. Id. at 1303.
343. Id.
344. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994) (defining qualified individual with a disability
as someone who can perform essential functions of the job in question with or without
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to properly fill prescriptions. If she were able to perform that function with the
accommodation of a modified work schedule or additional time off,the question
becomes whether the unpredictability of her need for that leave renders the
accommodation unreasonable.345 One rule that has emerged from reasonable
accommodation cases is that regular and reliable attendance is required for most
jobs.346 Short leaves of absence may be reasonable but extended, unpredictable
and excessive leaves will likely not be. 347 Following Karlan and Rutherglen's
concept of reasonable accommodation law creating a bargaining range, 348 the
plaintiff and her counsel are likely to take this into account when deciding
whether to press forward with a disability discrimination claim.
A similar analysis results regarding any duty the employer might have to
transfer the plaintiff to another position. 349 Finally, because disability
discrimination law does not give individuals with disabilities the right to avoid
consequences that are riot based on their disabilities, the employer may have a
defense if its actions were based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.350
reasonable accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (stating general prohibition
against qualified individuals with disabilities because of such disabilities).
345. More precisely, the question is whether the plaintiff can establish that the
accommodation is possible and the costs of it are not disproportionate to the benefits it
would produce. See Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1998);
accord Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)
(reasoning that employee must show accommodation is reasonable in sense of being both
efficacious and proportional to costs). If the employee succeeds in this showing, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove as an affirmative defense that the accommodation
was unreasonable or would pose an undue hardship. Gaul, 134 F.3d at 581; see also 42
U.S.C. § 12112 (b)(5)(A) (1994) (defining discrimination to include not making
reasonable accommodations to known disabilities unless entity can show the
accommodation would pose an undue hardship on the operation of the entity's business).
The employer may also show that the employee is not qualified for a position because
she poses a direct threat to the health and safety of other individuals in the workplace.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994). The text example of a pharmacist who is not capable
of accurately filling prescriptions suggests a direct threat issue.
346. See, e.g., Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that need for frequent absences could not be reasonably accommodated for
individual with teaching position).
347. See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 151 F.3d 591, 60001 (7th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing request for 2-4 weeks leave from rule providing
employer is not required to provide unlimited leave as accommodation).
348. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 254, at 30.
349. For example, the ADA includes reassignment to a vacant position within the
types of reasonable accommodation that may be required under the Act. 42 U.S.C. §
1211 1(9)(B) (1994). Courts have held that this does not require the employer to create
a new position for an employee with a disability or to "bump" an incumbent employee
from an existing position. See Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th
Cir. 1996).
350. See, e.g., Bailey v. Amsted Indus., 172 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (8th Cir. 1999)
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This doctrine was developed primarily under Title VII, but that law serves as
precedent to guide employer decisions in the ADA context as well.35'
This is not to suggest that placing the emphasis on qualification and
reasonable accommodation analysis is a panacea. There are certainly examples
of courts defining the legal standards regarding these issues in ways that seem
unduly narrow.35 2 At the same time, some courts have shown a willingness to
reconsider their prior positions. The Fifth Circuit, for instance, recently backed
away from a per se rule that individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes are not
qualified for positions as commercial drivers.353 In addition, the Tenth Circuit
very recently ruled en bane that individuals with disabilities seeking job
reassignment need only show they are qualified for the vacant position they seek,
not the position from which they seek reassignment because of their disability,
reversing an earlier panel decision to the contrary.354

(finding employer had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for firing employee for
taking 72 absences from work, vast majority of which were not for medical reasons and
not related to his disability). This rule comes from the general framework for analyzing
Title VII discrimination cases first set out in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), and is generally accepted in the circuit courts as applicable to ADA cases. See
Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins., 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995) (applying the Title VII
burden-shifting framework to ADA cases); DeLuca v. Winder Indus., 53 F.3d 793, 797
(7th Cir. 1995) (same); Ennis v. National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55, 57
(4th Cir. 1995) (same); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1339-40 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991) (same).
351. See, e.g., Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135 (8th Cir.)
(analogizing to Title VII cases interpreting legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 59 (1999); see also infra note 349.

352. See, e.g., Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 752 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that ADA does not create liability on the part of an employer for failing to engage in an
interactive process with employee when determining what accommodations if any would
be reasonable) vacated,reh'ggranted,2000 WL 130725 No. 96-16669 (9th Cir. Feb. 01,
2000); see also Colker, supra note 11, at 101, 119 & n.1 12.
353. See Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
as a matter of law that individuals with insulin-dependent diabetes are not otherwise
qualified for positions as commercial drivers), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1011 (1994).
Chandlerwas called into question by Kapche v. City ofSan Antonio, 176 F.3d 840, 846-

47 (5th Cir. 1999), which found that new technology and understanding of safety
concerns about diabetes requires reevaluation of prior per se rule. The Kapche court
remanded the case for determination of the current state of safety risks posed by insulindependent diabetics.
354. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999). A
prior panel of the Tenth Circuit ruled that an individual with a disability must first prove
that he is qualified for the position he currently holds, with or without accommodation,
before he is entitled to be reassigned. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 138 F.3d 1304,
1308-09 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd en banc, 180 F.3d 1154 (1999). Because employees
typically only seek reassignment when they are not able to perform the position they hold
even with accommodation, the effect of this earlier ruling was to restrict job reassignment
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Revising the ADA would send a strong signal to courts that Congress does
not approve of the courts' unduly narrow approach to disability discrimination
issues. Further, employers have their own set of incentives for non-litigation
resolutions if the emphasis is placed on reasonable accommodation, not the least
of which is the safe harbor from damages for employers who demonstrate a good
faith effort to identify and make those accommodations.3 5 A revised ADA
would place the correct focus on the fit between the individual and thejob. The
result should be a statute better designed in application and theory to extend civil
rights protections to individuals based on disability.
V. CONCLUSION
Disability rights advocates argue that courts have undermined the goals of
the ADA by adopting an excessively narrow interpretation of the law. As this
Article has demonstrated, Congress itself set that process in motion by adopting
a definition of disability under the ADA that is inherently flawed. The statutory
definition got caught up in the disability rights movement's struggle within
society for self-identification. In order to effectively function as a civil rights
statute, the ADA needs to move away from that struggle and look to more
objective criteria regarding what is a "disability."
There is likely to be some movement now in Congress to respond to the
recent trilogy of Supreme Court decisions. Unfortunately, the most likely
response will be to specifically delineate certain conditions as per se covered
disabilities.356 This may in turn trigger a new course of litigation in which
disability discrimination claimants must argue that their impairment is of
comparative significance to those contained in the list, while courts interpret the
list in a restrictive fashion. This would not represent a positive step in treating
disability as a civil rights issue. It essentially would repeat the sins of the past.
The position taken in this Article should not be construed to diminish the
experience of those individuals within our society who have experienced severe
forms of functional limitation. It is certainly true that some individuals have
been subjected to greater isolation from the benefits of society because of the
nature of their disability.3 7 The ADA must be an effective tool in whatever form

to only a narrow set of circumstances when the employer proves undue hardship in
keeping the employee in his current position.
355. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(3) (1994).

356. The EEOC initially considered adopting a list of "commonly disabling
impairments," but dismissed that approach out of concern that it might be misinterpreted
as implying that an individual with a listed impairment was automatically covered by the
statute. See AMERIcANs WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS AND EMPLOYER
OBLIGATIONS 3-15 to 3-16 (Jonathan R. Mook ed., 1996).
357. At least one individual with a disability has publicly praised the balance

struck by the Supreme Court in the "substantially limits trilogy," because in his words:
It doesn't make sense to group me, a quadriplegic, with someone who is nearPublished by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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it takes to provide these individuals with equal employment opportunities. There
are other ways to address their particular concerns, however, besides reserving
general disability discrimination protection for only a "deserving" few." 8
In a sense, disability is everyone's issue. At any point in time, any person
may find himself or herself experiencing disability. -The ultimate way to
eliminate the stigma associated with disability is to drive home that point. The
most effective way to drive home that point is to revise the ADA and do away
with the notion that there must be proof of substantial limitation before an
individual with an impairment that limits major life activities deserves antidiscrimination protection.

sighted but wears glasses.
... [T]he effect of diluting the definition of disability ... would ultimately
have hurt those who really need accommodations the most....
Now it is time to go about the more difficult and important work of
investing in medical research to find better treatments for real disabilities like
paralysis and genetic disorders.
Marco Sorani, Are the Rights of the Disabledin Jeopardy? Helpfor the Helpless (Letter
to the Editor), N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1999, at A16.
358. For example, affirmative action programs and other programs that provide
specialized services might use lists of "targeted disabilities" or other strict eligibility
criteria rather than the broad based definition of disability found in the general provisions
of the ADA. See Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 583.
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